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PANDORA'S BOX EXPOSED: UNTANGLING THE WEB
OF THE DOUBLE HELIX IN LIGHT OF
INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE
"I belonged to a new underclass, no longer determined by social sta-
tus or the color of your skin. No, we now have discrimination down
to a science."'
INTRODUCTION
"To the trained eye, much of who you are is written in your DNA." 2
Imagine a potential picture of the world to come. This is a world in
which procreation through natural sexual activity is not considered
normal. Children produced from a loving relationship, in which faith
is put in God or another higher power instead of the local geneticists,
are stigmatized from birth on. Having a healthy baby is no longer
considered a gift or blessing. Instead, seemingly perfect babies with
ten fingers and ten toes are imperfect because they have not come
from advanced technology.
Tremendous capabilities exist in this future world. Within seconds
of birth a blood sample could be taken and the exact time of the new-
born baby's death could be determined, as well as all of the medical
problems that would afflict the child throughout his or her adult life.
A child is considered chronically ill because of a need for glasses or
simply the knowledge that someday a life-threatening heart or liver
disorder will manifest itself. In fact, any ailment in this child's life,
however minor, is viewed as a threatening manifestation of a geneti-
cally imperfect body.
If the above scenario is not disturbing enough, imagine the life of a
child in the future who is rejected from birth, not only in terms of his
or her medical condition, but also because insurance will not cover
seemingly normal activities, such as a doctor's visit or exam. This ge-
netically imperfect child's own life may not be the worst obstacle
faced. Even worse is the genetically perfect sibling, a constant re-
minder of who the naturally conceived child can never become, and
who the child will never live up to. This genetically perfect brother or
sister is created through a scientific screening process in which parents
1. GATrACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
2. ELIZABETH L. MARSHALL, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: CRACKING THE CODE WITHIN
Us 8 (1996).
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have the ability to determine each trait of their scientific "miracle"
while the genetic specialists take the liberty to "eradicate any poten-
tially prejudicial condition."'3 In this world, nothing is left to chance
since the child is to be given the best possible start in life with as few
burdens as possible.
Life in such a situation, as impossible as it may be, would never be
easy for the genetically imperfect. Discrimination, although poten-
tially illegal, would likely occur in that one individual would be rele-
gated to a lower position because of immutable characteristics. Every
accomplishment in life would be pre-determined based on genetics.
DNA samples would be required for everything, from employment,
housing, class, insurance, to the determination with whom people
could associate. Failure to indicate an imperfect make-up would be
disastrous, as random genetic samples could be obtained from almost
anything ... hairs left in a brush, skin fragments remaining on some-
thing touched, or saliva remnants from envelopes.
When all is said and done, genetic flaws would be detrimental. A
reader may believe that this situation could only occur in the movies.
Perhaps such an extreme scenario as this imaginary world could only
occur in a motion picture. In fact, that is what transpired, give or take
some details, in the movie "Gattaca." However, is this movie really so
far off in analyzing what the future could hold for those on Earth? Is
it so impossible that genetics will move to the forefront of science in
such a way as to completely envelope life as we currently know it?
Perhaps not. Animals have recently been cloned for the first time,4
3. GATTACA, supra note 1.
4. See Stuart H. Orkin, Animal Cloning and Related Embryo Research: Implications for
Medicine, in 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: COMMISSIONED PAPERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION A-3 (1997). The press releases that
a sheep named "Dolly" was successfully cloned demonstrated to the world that for the first time
a mammal was created from the nucleus of an adult cell. Id. Developed from essentially the
same genetic material as an adult cell, Dolly represented a clone of the adult cell. Id. The
process of nuclear transfer that produced Dolly is typically referred to as animal cloning. Id.
This result is important for many reasons, but Dr. Orkin specifically focused on two. Id. First,
the work of Wilmut and colleagues in creating Dolly "provide[d] additional-and stunning-
evidence supporting the reversibility of the differentiated state." Id. This experiment is different
from those previously attempted because an adult cell was used instead of the cell of a younger
mammal. Id. Second, this experiment raised immediate concerns regarding the potential uses
and abuses of animal cloning, as well as its potential application to, for example, the cloning of
human beings. Id.
The word "clone" is used in many different contexts in scientific study, "but in simple terms it
means a set of genetically identical individuals." See also Janet Rossant, The Science of Animal
Cloning, in 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: COMMISSIONED PAPERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION B-3 (1997). When discussing clon-
ing, distinctions must be made between cloning DNA, "the process of making and propagating a
set of identical copies of a particular piece of genetic material[;]" cloning cells, "taking a single
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and humans may be next.5 These steps do not represent even a small
fragment of the genetic capabilities currently available, let alone those
which will be possible in the near future.
It is estimated that within the next decade, a doctor could use a
DNA chip, similar to a computer chip, to determine whether a per-
son's genes put them at risk for disease. 6 Alternately, if a disease de-
velops, such as cancer, a chip may determine the severity of the
ailment and which method of treatment best suits the individual's
case. 7 The science of such capabilities is astounding, even unbeliev-
able. As difficult as it is to imagine, the technology is here, and there
is no turning back.
The future of genetic science is unraveling daily. New discoveries
and advancements continually occur with spectacular results. The
practical implications of this new technology cannot be overlooked.
All too possible is a situation such as that in the movies where a ge-
cell in culture and allowing it to multiply into a cell line[;]" and cloning or identically copying
whole organisms. Id.
5. See Lori B. Andrews, The Current and Future Legal Status of Cloning, in 2 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS: COMMISSIONED PAPERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION F-3 (1997). With the potential to clone animals likely, fears
immediately spread that the same technology could be utilized in cloning humans. Id.
With the recent success in cloning an adult mammal, it is reasonable to start thinking
about the feasibility and impact of human cloning. Many reproductive and genetic pro-
cedures, such as artificial insemination by donor, embryo transfer, in vitro fertilization,
and preimplantation screening of embryos, were applied first in animals and then in
humans. Animal husbandry is a precursor to clinical reality for humans, with the time
of technology transfer to humans ever decreasing.
Id.
6. A doctor could use a DNA chip to determine whether a person will be at risk for heart
disease, Alzheimer's, and other disorders, as well as to assist in the treatment of diseases. Ingrid
Wickelgren, Gene Readers: Personal Gene Chips Reveal Your Risk for Deadly Diseases-and Tell
You How to Fight Back, POPULAR SCI, Nov. 1998, at 57. The process by which genes are read
occurs in the following manner:
HIGH-TECH CHIPS read your genetic blueprints to forecast what diseases you could
get-or help determine which treatments would work best for a disease you already
have. To decode the answers, single strands of known segments of DNA-the chemical
code that forms the blueprints for life-attach to unknown DNA samples.
Id. at 58. Although this technology is currently being developed, the techniques may not be
available to the public for quite some time. Id. at 60. "The technology and information are here
or are forthcoming, but we're still deciding whether it's ethically and economically worth using
them" explains Judes Poirier of the McGill Centre for Studies in Aging. Id. For example, ac-
cording to Poirier the United States Government has yet to take a formal position on whether or
not drug companies can use this technology, essentially leaving the companies to decide individ-
ually. Id.
7. Id. at 57. Particularly, this technology may allow for a form of "personalized medicine."
Id. at 60. "Doctors have long known that while certain treatments help some patients with a
disease, they have no effect on, or even harm, others." Id. Thus, the chips may offer an individu-
alized treatment option by making available the means necessary to identify disease distinctions
and creating personalized treatment alternatives. Id.
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netic underclass will be created and discriminated against through no
fault of its own. Worse yet, since genetics constitutes new technology,
there is little way of determining all that must be accomplished to pre-
vent problems in the future. What is known at this early stage is that
something must be done to prevent this information from being mis-
used and abused.
Due to the personal nature of genetic information, the data held
within a strand of DNA must be carefully monitored in order to pro-
tect individuals from exploitation and discrimination. There are many
situations in which such concerns apply, particularly in terms of em-
ployment opportunities (where employment could be denied as a re-
sult of tests), insurance coverage (where coverage could be denied or
revoked as a result of genetic predispositions), and personal privacy
(where an individual's entire being could be exposed). This Comment
will specifically address the increasing concerns about the improved
knowledge of genetics in the context of the health insurance industry.
Potentially one of the most significant corporate industries in exist-
ence, the health insurance industry has a great interest in genetic in-
formation. At the same time, consumers have good reason to
question if, when, and why insurance companies should have access to
personal genetic information. Particularly, consumers have reason to
question how such intimate knowledge of the person would impact
the underwriting process and insurance coverage in general.
Part I of this Comment addresses the basics of genetics, including
the origins of genetic knowledge, the path to increased genetic capa-
bility, the genetic testing revolution, the inner workings of the insur-
ance industry, and the arguments for and against the ability of health
insurance companies to access genetic testing information.8 Part II
will analyze past and current attempts to deal with this budding prob-
lem, both at the state and federal levels.9 Within this section, a gen-
eral overview of various legislative and regulatory frameworks will be
presented in an attempt to determine what framework is best suited to
assist with the problem at hand. 10 Part III will determine what has
currently succeeded, or what is still needed in order to make existing
or pending legislation feasible." This section will also examine the
politics of this issue, especially since the United States Congress has
bolstered genetics to the forefront of science with the implementation
8. See infra Background notes and accompanying text.
9. See infra Analysis notes and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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of the Human Genome Project ("HGP").12 Consequently, Congress
is forced to deal with potentially unforeseen ramifications of the pro-
ject that began less than ten years ago. Part IV will specifically ad-
dress the impact of managed care on the genetic frontier. 13 Part V
will conclude that some federal regulation is necessary to protect indi-
viduals from genetic discrimination and the creation of a genetic un-
derclass in insurance. This section will posit that such legislation
cannot not be rushed into, nor can it be predicated upon a desire by
Congress simply to close the Pandora's box opened up almost ten
years ago.' 4
BACKGROUND
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO GENES, BASIC GENETICS, AND THE
HUMAN GENOME
"Modern man is perhaps 50,000 years old, civilization has existed for
scarcely 10,000 years, and the United States for only just over 200
years; but DNA and RNA have been around for at least several bil-
lion years. "15
The human body consists of millions of cells that perform a variety
of individualized functions, such as growing hair and fighting off dis-
ease. 16 The study of genetics specifically deals with an exploration of
the latter, studying how organisms pass traits of anatomy, physiology,
and behavior from generation to generation through descendants.' 7
From the late 1800s and the studies of Gregor Mendel, 8 to the discov-
eries of James Watson and Francis Crick in the 1950s,19 and the recent
explosion of genetic knowledge gained through the HGP in the 1990s,
the examination of genetics has expanded from a little known or un-
derstood topic to a significant and often controversial field of scien-
tific discovery. 20
12. Id.
13. See infra Impact notes and accompanying text.
14. See infra Conclusion notes and accompanying text.
15. Francis Crick, quoted in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, ADVANCES IN GENETIC
INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR STATE POLICY MAKERS 6 (1993).
16. See Kristin M. Raffone, The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening and the Funda-
mental Right of Privacy, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 508 (1997).
17. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 2.
18. Gregor Mendel, an Augustinian monk, is attributed with originating the study of modern
genetics through experiments that first acknowledged the existence of hereditary characteristics.
Id.
19. Raffone, supra note 16, at 508-09.
20. See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma
in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L.J. 503, 506-07 (1996-1997); Raffone, supra note
16, at 505-07.
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The origins of modern genetics trace their roots to the experiments
of Gregor Mendel in the 1860s.21 While tending the experimental gar-
dens of an Augustinian monastery, Mendel discovered the initial char-
acteristics of heredity when he noticed that the same kinds of seeds
produced different varieties of plants. 22 Choosing the pea plant as his
study population, Mendel was able to produce pure varieties of pea
plant offspring that always possessed the same traits.23 Then, taking
these homozygous varieties, Mendel crossed the pea plants to study
one particular trait at a time, "such as round or wrinkled seeds. '' 24 His
experiments indicated that the first generation from such a cross pro-
duced only a single form of a trait (i.e., round seeds), which he
deemed the dominant trait.2 5 Mendel then crossed the plants with the
dominant trait from the first generation, with the result being that the
dominant trait appeared in only 75% of the offspring, and the other
trait, introduced as the recessive trait,26 appeared in the rest of the
plants.2 7 Mendel's understanding of heredity gained from these now
famous pea plant experiments is presently known to describe the base
pair sequence of DNA, but this discovery would not occur for quite
some time, and certainly was not apparent to Mendel.28
Geneticists sought to further their knowledge of heredity, particu-
larly the workings of the human body and the development of specific
human traits.2 9 Scientists sought to increase knowledge about how the
cells of the human body work together to perform the tasks necessary
for its existence.30 In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discov-
ered that within the nucleus of each cell are chromosomes containing
proteins and deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). 31 "This substance
[DNA] gives each cell the 'directions' necessary to perform its specific
functions as well as the directions necessary to coordinate those tasks
21. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 2. Gregor Mendel was a monk
educated in agriculture and sheep breeding. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. A "dominant trait" is defined as "said of an allele that expresses its phenotype even in
the presence of a recessive allele." Id. at 109. An "allele" is "one of two or more alternative
forms of a gene that exist at a specific gene location on a chromosome, giving rise to alternative
hereditary characteristics." Id. at 108.
26. A recessive trait "refers to traits which are outwardly expressed only when both members
of the same gene pair are identical." Id. at 112.
27. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Raffone, supra note 16, at 508.
30. Id.
31. Id. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7; MARSHALL, supra
note 2, at 17; LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 76 (3d ed. 1998).
[Vol. 49:161
1999] PANDORA'S BOX 167
within the larger workings of the human body."' 32 At the time of this
initial finding, Watson and Crick also determined that DNA exists in a
specific arrangement, which they called the double helix.33 The Wat-
son-Crick model now helps to explain that DNA can act as a gene and
that all cells in any individual have the same form of DNA. 34 As a
result of this discovery, the study of molecular or biochemical genetics
dealing with the basic chemical structure of genes and the mechanisms
by which genes control and regulate protein synthesis occurred.35
The Watson-Crick model offerred tremendous insight into the struc-
ture and function of DNA. According to the model, DNA consists of
two components. 36 "The first is a sugar-phosphorous chain, and the
second component is a group of four basic units called nucleotides,
which extend horizontally from the sugar-phosphorous chain; the four
bases are adenine (A), guanine (G), thyamine (T), and Cytosine
(C). 3 7 Every molecule of DNA consists of two distinct DNA strands
joined by weak hydrogen bonds, with each strand consisting of smaller
molecular units called nucleotides. 38 As the bases pair up in the pre-
scribed manner, A with T and C with G, the chains wrap around one
another, forming the standard double-helix figure.39 Researchers esti-
mate that approximately three billion nucleotide base-pairs exist, with
nearly three million differences occurring in the base pairs of any two
given people.40 The order and organization of the base pairs is the
genetic information that constitutes an individual's genetic make-up.41
32. Raffone, supra note 16, at 508-09.
33. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7; STRYER, supra note 31, at 76.
The double helix is technically referred to as "the shape in which two linear strands of DNA are
bonded together." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 109.
34. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7.
35. Id. As a result of this breakthrough in the field of genetic science, the study of genetics
jettisoned to the place of prominence it presently holds.
36. See STRYER, supra note 31, at 76; Raffone, supra note 16, at 509.
37. See Raffone, supra note 16, at 509. Two sets of chain and base combinations exist, and the
bases from each chain attract and attach with each other in particular ways. STRYER, supra note
31, at 76. As a result, adenine (A) always pairs with thyamine (T), and guanine (G) always pairs
with cytosine (C). Id. See also JAN CHRISTIAN HELLER, HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH AND THE
CHALLENGE OF CONTINGENT FUTURE PERSONS 21-22 (1996).
38. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7; STRYER supra note 31, at 76.
A nucleotide consists of three smaller parts: a five-carbon sugar, a phosphate group, and one of
the four nitrogen bases (A, T, G, C). STRYER, supra note 31, at 76-77.
39. Id.
40. HELLER, supra note 37, at 22.
41. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7-8.
Only a very small proportion of an organism's DNA is responsible for the characteris-
tics that make that individual unique from closely related species or others of its own
species. In humans, the base sequence of each member of an autosome (half of a non-
sex chromosome pair) differs from that of its partner at about one percent of its base
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DNA is one of the most significant of all known macromolecules in
existence.42 "Whether the cell is one of billions making up a complex
human or the single cell of a bacterium, it contains at least one mole-
cule of DNA. '' 43 The significance of DNA is that it encodes or em-
bodies cells to produce the proteins necessary for cell survival.44
Genes consist of regions along the DNA containing the instructions
for a single chemical composition.45 Genes can also be thought of as
concentrated nodes of DNA, which are distributed along chromo-
somes, and serve as the basic units of heredity.46 The genetic code is
determined by the order and sequence of nucleotides existing in a
string of DNA, which the cells read as a series of three letter words
(codons). 47 These codons code for specific amino acids.48 The amino
acids are strung together to form peptide chains, and from this, com-
plex proteins result 49 that assist in the orderly functioning of the
human body.50 Proteins "build and repair an organism's various parts,
catalyze metabolic processes, and even regulate the activity of other
genes."'51 Also, as a result of the fact that genes contain the instruc-
tions necessary to produce proteins, they, in conjunction with numer-
ous environmental factors, determine the color of a person's eyes and
hair, and even the shape of an individual's nose.52
Each human cell contains approximately 50,000-100,000 genes.53
The sum of these genes collectively as packaged in chromosomes is
known as the human genome. 54 The human genome contains the
complete set of chemical instructions for the make-up of a human
sites. Essentially, this is the amount of genetic difference between one human being
and another.
Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 7. The significance of DNA results from the fact that it controls the development
and function of all life and the life processes. Id.
43. Id.
44. STRYER, supra note 31, at 71; Raffone, supra note 16, at 509.
45. "Genes code for (direct) the production of protein products that build and repair an or-
ganism's various parts, catalyze metabolic processes, and even regulate the activity of other
genes." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7.
46. HELLER, supra note 37, at 22. Genes code for, or define, specific amino acids which are
strung together to form peptide chains and ultimately proteins. Id.
47. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 17.
48. HELLER, supra note 37, at 22; STRYER, supra note 31, at 99.
49. HELLER, supra note 37, at 22.
50. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 20.
51. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7.
52. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 20.
53. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7. This number excludes
human red blood cells which contain no nuclei. Id. The exact number of genes in each human
cell is still unknown. Id.
54. Id. at 11.
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body.55 "Untold thousands of proteins and other chemicals-fats and
carbohydrates, for example-give the human body function and
form."56
The human genome consists of twenty-three pairs of chromosomes
made up of DNA.5 7 Human chromosomes range in size from 50 mil-
lion to 250 million of the DNA bases (A, T, G, C).58 These four bases
entirely make up the "alphabet of the genetic code," and variations in
the order and pairing of the bases create different genetic sequences
or codes. 59 A mutation in one gene may lead to a number of defects
in the corresponding protein, which sometimes results in a genetic ab-
normality.60 A mutation "can consist of an extra base added, an ex-
isting base dropped, or substitution of one base type for another. '61
Variations in heredity result from changes occuring during DNA
replication. 62
Thousands of genetic disorders are presently known to have a ge-
netic component, affecting over half of the United States population. 63
Some of these disorders are caused by different alleles, such as cystic
fibrosis, while others, such as heart disease, result from a genetic pre-
disposition to the particular disease.64 Defects related to different al-
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id.
57. See Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A Closing
of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 551, 555 (1996). "These 46 chromosomes are arranged as
22 pairs of chromosomes in our cells, each member of which is called an autosome, plus the X
and Y chromosomes which determine sex. Each chromosome carries a multi-folded molecule of
DNA." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 7.
58. Bornstein, supra note 57, at 556. If stretched out end to end, the DNA strands from any of
the body's 100 trillion cells would extend about 2.7 meters. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, supra note 15, at 8. This means that if all the DNA strands in a human body were
stretched end to end, they would reach the moon and back almost one million times. Id.
59. See Bornstein, supra note 57, at 556. See also THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
supra note 15, at 8 ("Some 50,000 to 100,000 discrete segments of DNA-each several thousand
or more base pairs long-constitute the genes that store our genetic information. The problem
is to figure out where these genes lie, and what information each encodes.").
60. Bornstein, supra note 57, at 557.
61. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 9.
62. Id.
63. Bornstein, supra note 57, at 557. "More than 125 million Americans are affected by a
human disorder with a genetic component." See id. at n.29 (citing Henry T. Greely, Health
Insurance, Employment Discrimination, and the Genetics Revolution, in THE CODE OF CODES
264, 265 (Daniel J. Keules & Leroy Hood eds., 1992)).
64. Id. at 557-58. As the map of the human genome is decoded and more is learned about the
hereditary patterns of diseases, announcements are constantly made regarding "the finding of a
gene 'for' colon cancer, breast cancer, prostate cancer, cystic fibrosis and even less for less
hardwired-seeming conditions such as anxiety and 'risk-taking."' Should Insurance Pay For Pre-
ventive Services Suggested by Genetics?, MANAGED CARE 1997 (last modified June 15, 1999)
<http://www.managedcaremag.com/archiveMC/9701/9701.genetics.shtml>. Once these and other
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leles of genes result from the production of a faulty protein and a
resulting problematic gene caused by an inadequate DNA sequence. 65
Problems related to genetic predisposition find a link somewhere in
the hereditary pattern of the individual.66 While some individuals suf-
fer from visible genetic diseases, others may carry an aberrant gene
that can pass to their offspring, thus creating a genetic predisposi-
tion.67 Genetic testing can also determine whether an individual is
predisposed to a genetic disorder.68 This advancing knowledge may
result in significant problems for communities around the world.
II. THE GENETIC TESTING REVOLUTION
Geneticists have been tracing family histories to study the inheri-
tance of particular diseases and ailments for many decades. Genetic
testing currently offers the capabilities to detect alleles, changes in
DNA, or chromosomal changes using easily accessible tissue sam-
ples.69 Tests completed before the onset of a genetic disease offer an
individual the ability to invoke preventative measures to ward off the
disease, while early detection of an abnormality can offer precious
time to treat an existing problem. 70 Beyond this scope, genetic testing
is said to serve four main purposes: (1) carrier identification of people
who may be at risk to produce an offspring with a disease; (2) prenatal
and newborn diagnosis to identify at a young age those afflicted with
genetic problems; (3) presymptomatic and predisposition testing of
people who may have genes that could make them ill in the future;
and (4) DNA profiling used in forensic DNA matching situations. 71
genes are located on the genome and specifically isolated, a test for the location is likely to
follow. Id. However, the ability to deal with the findings may not be so absolute. Id.
65. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 20.
66. See Bornstein, supra note 57, at 557-61.
67. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 20.
68. Bornstein, supra note 57, at 558-59. "Currently, hundreds of tests that identify an individ-
ual's genetic predisposition to rare inherited disorders are available. Moreover, many tests will
soon predict more common illnesses, such as heart disease." Id. at 559-60.
69. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 10. Carrier screening tests look directly for a defective gene or identify other parts
of DNA that mark disorders within a family. Id. at 25. Gene markers tend to be inherited along
with the diseased gene and signal the probability of the presence of the gene. Id. Fetal testing,
conducted prior to birth, or newborn diagnosis offer information that may be used for birth
preparations, in-utero treatments, decisions about termination of the a pregnancy, or in early
development care. Id. at 23. Presymptomatic tests allow for the prediction of genetic risks
otherwise not definable. Id. at 28. DNA fingerprinting is typically used in criminal investiga-
tions, the identification of unknown remains, paternity and maternity classifications, and a wide
variety of other areas where individuals need to be identified. Id. at 81-83.
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Three types of genetic tests are currently available: predisposition
testing, genetic monitoring, and DNA profiling.72 Genetic predisposi-
tion tests are taken of an individual at one time to detect a genetic
condition or a potential disease, or a predisposition to either the con-
dition or disease.73 Genetic monitoring consists of the periodic use of
genetic testing to identify any changes occurring in an individual's ge-
netic make-up over a period of time.74 Finally, DNA profiling is when
testing is used in a forensic capacity to identify an individual by
matching a sample of his or her DNA with criminal evidence.75
Given the advanced technical capabilities scientists now possess,
and a worldwide desire to continue learning about the genetic compo-
sition of the human body, it was only a matter of time before a large
scale genetic testing and knowledge building effort appeared in the
mainstream scientific arena. In September 1986, the United States
Government launched two studies to "determine the viability of a
large scale gene mapping and sequencing project. ''76 First, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences study, conducted through the National
Research Council, concluded in 1988 that the potential benefits of a
large scale genetic investigation project warranted an annual budget
of 200 million dollars over fifteen years.77 Second, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment also issued an approving report for the culmina-
tion of a genetic project.78 Together, these studies prompted Congress
to formally commence discussion on the possibility of the HGP as a
federally funded program to further expand knowledge about the
composition and workings of the human genome.79
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. Newborn screening for inherited disorders is a prominent example of genetic screen-
ing. Id.
74. Id. "For example, workplace genetic monitoring is used to assess genetic changes from
employee exposure to toxic chemicals or radiation." Id. Such "monitoring" procedures typically
only occur in experimental contexts. Id.
75. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 10. This kind of DNA testing,
which is not considered a diagnostic tool, is also called "DNA fingerprinting." Id.
76. Burk Burnett, Genetic Discrimination: Legislation Required to Keep Genetic Secrets, 21
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 502, 510 (1997). Due to the increased knowledge available through the
study of genetics, as well as the potential for technological advancements, such a large scale
project was deemed as a potentially viable means to conquer the new generation of genetic
knowledge. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 510-11.
79. Id. at 511.
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III. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: A CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT
FOR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
"The ability to chop up DNA, the stuff of which genes are made, and
move the pieces, permits the direct examination of the human
genome. 8
0
The Human Genome Initiative is an international program com-
prised of a collective scientific effort to study the characteristics, form,
and content of the human genome.81 What is known as the HGP is
that portion of the worldwide genetic initiative conducted throughout
the United States.8 2 Officially commencing with the start of the 1990
fiscal year-October 1, 1989-the HGP is a fifteen year joint venture
primarily involving the United States Department of Energy
("DOE")8 3 and the National Institute of Health ("NIH"). 84 The HGP
is estimated to cost $3 billion over the fifteen year period, of which
80. NEIL A. HOLTZMAN, PROCEED WITH CAUTION: PREDICTING GENETIC RISKS IN THE RE-
COMBINANT DNA ERA 1 (1989).
81. See HELLER, supra note 37, at 21. At least 18 countries have established associated pro-
grams, including larger ones in: "Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, European Union,
France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and the United States." U.S. Department of Energy Human Genome Program,
Human Genome Project Information: Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Oct. 1, 1998)
<http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human-Genome/faq/faqsl.html>. Smaller developing
countries are also taking an active role, participating in studies of molecular biology and genome
research pertaining to their particular geographic region's needs. Id.
82. See HELLER, supra note 37, at 21. The HGP is currently carried out all over the United
States with small groups of scientists (300 to 400 teams in all), mostly at large research universi-
ties, each working on one piece of the genome puzzle. MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 12. Some
groups are scheduled to work on specific chromosomal regions, while other research groups are
developing technologies that will make future genetic exploration faster, cheaper, and easier. Id.
83. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81. Subsequent to the dropping of the atomic
bomb, Congress charged the DOE's predecessor agencies with studying and analyzing the struc-
ture of the human genome. Id. From these studies grew a recognition that the best way to
directly study genetic issues was to study the entire human genome and DNA directly. Id.
Among other things, the DOE has focused its HGP efforts on: mapping human chromosomes,
comparative studies, development of important biological resources, and technologies for effec-
tive and efficient DNA sequencing. Id.
84. See HELLER, supra note 37, at 21; Raffone, supra note 16, at 510; U.S. Department of
Energy Human Genome Program, Human Genome Project Information (last modified Sept. 4,
1998) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/home.html>. The HGP is jointly
run by individuals from both the DOE and the NIH. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81.
The DOE's HGP is headed by Ari Patrinos, and the NIH Program is under the direction of
Francis Collins. Id.
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Congress made an initial appropriation of $135 million.85 As of 1998,
the DOE and NIH spent over $303 million on the HGP.86
The idea to institute a program such as the HGP was put on the
congressional agenda in the mid-1980's as a means to settle an inter-
agency dispute concerning which federal agency should head the pro-
ject, as well as a response to various scientific, political, economic, and
cultural factors which existed at the time. 87 As originally conceived,
the HGP was not intended to begin a new scientific undertaking but
was to continue existing research on a more restricted scale coordi-
nated under a new administrative structure. 88 In determining what
type of funding should be allocated, Congress underwent a cost-bene-
fit analysis to establish and quantify the means and ends sought by the
HGP.89 After determining the potential discoveries possible from
joint cooperation of federal agencies, along with federal funding, Con-
gress appropriated the necessary funds to allow the HGP to begin its
fifteen year mission.90
Because of the revolutionary nature of the HGP,91 and the fact that
the project is federally funded, it has often been compared to the
Apollo Moon Project 92 and somewhat less frequently to the Manhat-
85. See ROGER LINCOLN SHINN, THE NEW GENETICS: CHALLENGES FOR SCIENCE, FAITH,
AND POLITIs 29 (1996). The $3 billion anticipated cost of the HGP characterizes it as the larg-
est single biological research project ever conducted. HELLER, supra note 37, at 25.
86. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81. The DOE spent approximately $85.5 mil-
lion as of 1998, and the NIH an estimated $217.7 million. Id.
87. HELLER, supra note 37, at 26. The steps leading to new congressional policy are highly
complex and political, with each individual and party presenting a unique view. The process can
be simplified by conceptualizing a two-step process involving "first, getting an item on the con-
gressional agenda and, second, having that item selected over competing items or over compet-
ing versions of the same item." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 34. The cost-benefit analysis was fairly short-range, used primarily as a justification
for the process as a whole, and was implemented to determine an optimal input-output level for
resources and anticipated results. Id. at 26, 35.
90. Id. at 25. The "[HGP] was funded directly by Congress through special authorizations and
appropriations." Id.
91. The HGP was initially considered revolutionary given the parameters of research to be
completed within the constrained budget and time limitations. Id. at 27.
92. Id. at 24. The Apollo manned lunar program was instituted by President John F. Kennedy
on May 25, 1961, at a time when the Soviet Union far surpassed the United States in moon
exploration. Bob Brennert, NASA Apollo Program (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://
users.uniserve.com/-bob/apolloinfo.html>. The primary goal of the program was to land
humans on the moon and subsequently bring them back to earth safely. The Apollo Program
(1963-1972) (last modified Oct. 13, 1998) <http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/
apollo.html>. Six of the missions went to the moon (Apollos 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17) and
returned with a tremendous amount of data and almost 400 kilograms of lunar samples. Id.
Numerous experiments were conducted, such as tests with soil mechanics, meteoroids, magnetic
fields, lunar ranging, and solar wind. Id. Apollos 7 and 9 were Earth-orbiting missions, Apollos
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tan project. 93 "Similar to the 1961 decision made by President John F.
Kennedy to send a man to the moon, the United States has committed
itself to a highly visible and important goal [of mapping and sequenc-
ing the human genome] .... A more important set of instruction
books will never be found by human beings." 94
As previously explained, the human genome consists of all genetic
material.95 A great deal has been accomplished in terms of gaining
knowledge about the human genome, such that "[t]he techniques of
gene identification, separation and splicing now allow us to discover
the basic causes of ailments and, thus, to progress toward cures and
even precursory treatments that might ward off the onset of illness
ranging from cancer to heart disease and AIDS. '96 A blueprint laying
out the human genome structure was lacking to aid in scientific dis-
covery; 97 therefore, the main goal of the HGP is to further knowledge
and understanding of the intricate workings of the human genome by
creating a complete map of the human genome sequence. 98 Conse-
quently, the HGP was designed to "further our basic understanding of
human genetics and of the role of various genes in health and
disease." 99
8 and 10 tested components while orbiting the moon, and Apollo 13 did not land on the moon
due to craft malfunctions, but did return photographs. Id.
93. HELLER, supra note 37, at 24. "The object of the [Manhattan] project [was] to produce a
practical military weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released by a fast neutron
chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission." Robert Serber, in
The Life and Times of the Manhattan Project (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.gis.net/-carter/
manhattan/>. Sparked by refugee physicists in the United States, the Manhattan Project was the
code name for efforts by the United States Government to produce the first atomic bomb during
World War II. Id. The Project was named after the Manhattan Engineer District of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers since the majority of the early research relating to the project
was conducted in New York. Id. The Program was organized slowly after the discovery of nu-
clear fission by German scientists in 1938, and progressed into a total effort to create a chain
reaction of nuclear fission that would render a usable weapon of destruction. Id.
94. See HELLER, supra note 37, at 24 (quoting James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project:
Past, Present, and Future, 248 SCIENCE 44 (1990)).
95. Id. at 21.
96. See GEORGE J. ANNAS & SHERMAN ELIAS, GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS
GUIDES 3 (1992).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 23; Raffone, supra note 16, at 511.
This map will serve as the source book for biomedical science in the 21st century and
will be of immense benefit ... [in] understand[ing] and eventually treat[ing] many of
the more than 4,000 genetic diseases that afflict mankind, as well as the many mul-
tifactorial diseases in which genetic predisposition plays an important role.
Id. at 511. So far, roughly 10% of the human genome has been sequenced. Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 81.
99. Raffone, supra note 16, at 511 (citing The National Genome Research Institute, Under-
standing Our Genetic Inheritance <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP/HGP-goals/5yrplan.html>).
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The HGP is intended to identify the estimated 80,000 genes existing
in human DNA and determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical
bases (combinations of A, T, G, and C) that comprise human DNA
for use in databases and in development of various tools for data anal-
ysis.100 More specifically, two preliminary objectives exist which are
necessary to assist in the completion of the HGP.a0 l First, the HGP
aims to create and produce a high resolution genetic map of the mark-
ers that comprise the twenty-three chromosome pairs of the human
genome. l02 Essentially, this will entail the identification of chromo-
somes as part of a linear sequence. 10 3 Second, "learning" maps of all
DNA and chromosomes of selected organisms will be produced to aid
scientists in grasping the big picture of the human genome.10 4
Numerous benefits are anticipated to result from the discoveries of
the HGP, some anticipated and others unknown at this point in
time.10 5 Specifically, the potential benefits from the HGP can be dif-
ferentiated into three categories.' 0 6 First, the HGP is expected to cre-
ate information about genetic endowments through the creation of a
complete map of the human genome.10 7 This will likely result in the
capability to identify an individual's predisposition to genetic dis-
eases. s08 Second, the HGP may help to create intervention proce-
dures to prevent and treat an increasing . number of genetic
problems.'0 9 Third, the HGP is expected to produce the ability to cre-
ate or enhance desirable characteristics within an individual.110
Generally, as a result of the genetic research efforts, biologists, re-
searchers, and other scientists can expect the project to provide "de-
100. Human Genome Project Information, supra note 84. When complete, it is estimated that
a printout of the human genome would equate to approximately 13 sets of the Encyclopedia
Britannica. SHINN, supra note 85, at 29.
101. Raffone, supra note 16, at 511.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 512.
104. Id.
Scientists presume that functionally important DNA is present among humans as well
as other organisms, and that by comparing these pieces of DNA among and between
various organisms as against the standard set forth by the human genome map, greater
insight into the workings of DNA sequences can be gained.
Id. at n.37.
105. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81.
106. See Maxwell F. Mehlman, Access to the Genome and Federal Entitlement Programs, in
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 113 (Thomas H. Murray et
al. eds., 1996).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 114. This result is not part of the mandate of the HGP, but does lay as part of the
ultimate goal of the research. Id.
110. Id.
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tailed DNA information that will be key to understanding the
structure, organization, and function of DNA in chromosomes." '111
Additionally, the information gathered will likely be the starting
ground for a great number of comparative genetic studies revolution-
izing the future of biological knowledge.112 Genetic mapping will also
allow for the discovery of genes involved in a variety of genetic dis-
eases, such that further studies will continue toward a higher level of
understanding of the role of genes. 113
As a result of this information, the medical community will have to
accommodate the new diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives which
will be available. 114 All of this is expected to increase the potential for
commercial development in a variety of industries, for example, "sales
of biotechnology products are projected to exceed $20 billion by
2000. ''115 The potential implications for the future are non-exhaustive,
as the information attained from the HGP will be extremely influen-
tial in a number of medical and health related industries. Primary
among the industries affected and interested in the new knowledge is
the health insurance field. 116 To fully understand the interrelationship
111. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81.
When finally interpreted, the genetic messages encoded within our DNA will ... not
only help us understand how we function as healthy human beings, but will also ex-
plain, at the chemical level, the role of genetic factors in a multitude of diseases, such as
cancer, Alzheimer's disease, and schizophrenia, that diminish the individual lives of so
many millions of people.
HELLER, supra note 37, at 24.
112. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 81.
113. Id.
114. Id.
The long-range goal of the Human Genome Initiative is treatment, prevention, and
cure. But the initial benefits of the science are going to be in detection. And, for a
while we are going to be in an interim phase in which you can detect, but you cannot
[treat or cure those disorders that are detected].
HELLER, supra note 37, at 51 (quoting Nancy S. Wexler in The Human Genome Initiative and the
Future of Biotechnology, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space, 101st
Cong. 101-528 (1989).
115. Id.
116. In light of new developments, the health insurance industry, as well as the life and disa-
bility insurance companies, have a great stake in the application of the new genetic knowledge,
as:
[t]he stakes in the genetic information and testing battle are bigger for life and disabil-
ity companies because, unlike the vast majority of health insurance, these policies are
sold on an individual rather than a group basis. Each life and disability policyholder's
individual mortality or disability risk, therefore, is more important to the insurance
company than is the case with group health plans that underwrite and set premiums for
a large beneficiary pool.
Robert H. Gettlin, Genetic Testing Takes Center Stage: Effect of Genetic Legislation on Insurance
Business, 98 BEST'S REVIEW: LIFE-HEALTH INSURANCE EDITION 12, 12 (1997). This is particu-
larly applicable to the life insurance industry where medical underwriting plays a significant role
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of basic genetic testing and knowledge with the health insurance in-
dustry, it is first necessary to comprehend the workings of insurance
and its significance.
IV. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: POLICIES, UNDERWRITING, AND
THE SOCIAL PROCESS
It is fundamental to the contemporary insurance market to assess
risk. According to one industry spokesperson, 'The insurance indus-
try is built upon a basic insurance principle: the ability to appropri-
ately and accurately evaluate risks and, in turn, price the product.'
The industry wants to be able to predict who is likely to develop a
serious disease and whose disease is expected to be prolonged or
expensive."17
The insurance industry is multifaceted. On the one hand, insurance
companies provide a public service by offering individuals holding
policies which extend protection necessary for unexpected future
events. On the other hand, insurance is a business, an industry of
great importance to the economy, which works to maximize profit and
guarantee continued success. 18 Unlike other business corporations,
however, insurance is special because it is run on a system of making
bets on the pooling of risks of participants."19 In essence, insurance
companies, especially health insurance entities, make profit by operat-
ing on the assumption that its coverage will rarely be paid out to an
in the creation and implementation of policies, and the results of genetic testing could directly
reflect upon the policies available and the terms of the policy in general. The genetic revolution
is also having a tremendous impact in employment, not only in terms of insurance policies, but
also given the fact that employers are very interested in hiring and maintaining a healthy and
capable work-force. This area of law is well beyond the scope of this Comment, as are the areas
of life and disability insurance in general. Another area likely to be impacted is the medical
health field, where "[tihe right to doctor-patient confidentiality is under attack by computer
technology, managed care, and genetic science." Arthur Allen, Medical Privacy? Forget Itd,
MED. ECON., May 11, 1998, at 151, available in LEXIS.
117. Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health on Life Insurance, in GE-
NETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 299, 301
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
118. In order to make a healthy yearly profit off the sale of insurance policies, an insurance
company must sell the majority of their insurance plans to individuals who will not get sick.
RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC INFORMATION
IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS 140 (1993). This can be difficult, however, since
"'[there is a natural tendency on the part of the consuming public who need [health insurance]
coverage to seek it out only when there is a perceived need for medical care, and to cancel the
insurance when the immediate need no longer exists."' MEHLMAN ET AL. EDS., supra note 106,
at 136.
119. Kass, supra note 117, at 301.
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individual policyholder.12 0 As a result, this will require an individual
to pay higher premiums if it has reason to believe that the client will
incur costly expenses over time.' 2a Thus, an insurance company's
knowledge about its policyholders is a key determinant in its
success. 122
Typically, people obtain health insurance in one of three ways:
group insurance policies, self insurance plans, or individual insur-
ance. 123 Each plan differs in the method through which insurance is
received by the individual and the requirements for acceptance.
Group insurance is typically attained at a cost-shared benefit through
an employer, in which the group who is sponsored serves as the pri-
mary insured party. 24 In order to qualify for group insurance, medi-
cal information or other proof of qualified insurability are typically
not required because the insurance companies focus their attention on
the group as a whole in the medical underwriting 125 process.126
120. Id. at 301. The insurance industry predicates itself on the ability to successfully predict
who is likely to acquire a disease, what kind of sickness is suspected, the extent to which the
problem will impact the individual, and the potential severity and necessity of treatment. Id.
121. HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 118, at 141.
122. Id. Insurers desire to possess as much accurate and predictive information as lawfully
possible before a decision is made to insure anyone. Id.
123. Actually, there are four main methods by which to acquire insurance protection, includ-
ing: group insurance, self-insurance, individual insurance, and publicly financed insurance bene-
fits. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 44. This Comment will only
focus on the first three means.
124. Id. The insurance contract is therefore assented to by the insurance company and the
employer acting on behalf of all the members of the group who will be receiving the benefits.
125. Insurance products are intended to provide protection against unanticipated personal
losses. The Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Testing/Insurance Issues, Background Statement:
Genetic Testing and Insurance, 56 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 327, 327 (1995). "While everyone will die
and most will at some time become seriously ill, we generally do not expect to die early, and we
all believe it will be someone else who will be disabled or become ill." Id. Insurance replaces
income or pays for health care in the event that an unanticipated event occurs as a means of
mitigating loss. Id.
Standard premiums are calculated on the expected outcome for large numbers of indi-
viduals with similar risks and are expected to spread the cost of the loss among a group.
Prior to issuing a policy, however, insurers must determine the risk that an individual
client presents and must adjust their premium to acknowledge that risk. The process is
called underwriting.
Id. Traditionally, medical underwriting was only used in cases of individual insurance, because
employees and their dependents were at least as healthy as the population. Mark A. Rothstein,
The Use of Genetic Information for Nonmedical Purposes, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 109, 113 (1994-
1995). Such an assurance of health could not be made for people seeking individual coverage, so
medical assessments were used. Id. The practice of underwriting differs somewhat depending
on the type of insurance. In an individual situation, underwriting is driven by the principle of
adverse selection, which stands for the proposition that individuals who know they are likely to
need health insurance at some point will seek out high policy coverage. Id. In a group situation,
where the group is underwritten as an entity, a different procedure occurs, especially if the group
consists of more than two hundred individuals. Philip J. Lehpamer, Principles of Risk: Health,
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Groups are accepted for coverage when the insurance provider can
conclude from the information presented that the potential for ex-
pected claims meets established company standards for a benefit
plan. 27 A rate plan is then calculated commensurate with the com-
pany's risk assessment of the applicant pool or group. 128
The second primary means of insurance within the United States is
self insurance. 129 Self insurance, contrary to what the name may im-
ply, is not directly purchased by individuals. 130 In a self employment
situation, individuals are covered under plans through their place of
employment, but the employer is not enrolled in a group policy.131
Instead, the individuals themselves enjoy the benefits of insurance
coverage without being confined to the parameters of a group. As
with group insurance, the individual receiving the benefits of a self
insurance policy is not the actual insured, for the company itself is
self-insured. 132
A smaller percentage of people have individual insurance, which is
a contract entered into between the insurer and the individual appli-
cant.133 In order to qualify for individual insurance, a person must be
able to demonstrate to the insurance company that he or she is part of
a well-defined, healthy, and fairly homogeneous group.134 When
someone applies for such insurance, medical underwriting occurs to
Disability, Life, 1998 GENETIC TESTING: IMPLICATIONS FOR INSURANCE 8. "In large-group un-
derwriting, information about specific employees and their dependents, other than prior medical
claims, is not obtained." Id. The first step in the underwriting process consists of analyzing
needs. Id. Then medical care treatments are estimated, including changes expected in medical
utilization. Id.
If there are no unusual changes within the group, then the prior claim experience
trended forward to the next policy period becomes the expected prospective claim
amount for that group. However, the discovery of a large ongoing claim would cause
the underwriter to adjust the expected claim trend upward. Changes in provider ar-
rangements caused by various forms of managed care would also be reflected prospec-
tively, with the anticipated prospective claim amount for the group adjusted upward or
downward, depending on the nature of the new provider arrangements.
Id.
126. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 44.
127. Id.
128. Id. Larger groups are often "experience-rated," such that the premiums charged reflect
the actual amount of claims submit and paid by the group in the past. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 44-45.
132. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 44-45. In essence, the com-
pany forms its own insurance pool. Id.
133. Id. at 45. Individual insurance policies, as with most others, offer coverage not only to
the insured individual but also to spouses and dependents. Id.
134. Id. "However, individuals are free to apply for various types and amounts of coverage."
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assure a similar chance of loss within a risk class.' 35 Through this pro-
cess, a determination is made as to whether coverage is available and
under what terms. 136 Commonly, individual insurance will be denied
to applicants who present a probability of disease three times exceed-
ing the industry standard for someone of the same gender and age.137
Approximately 85% of American citizens under the age of 65 pos-
sess some sort of health insurance. 138 Of this number, about 85-90%
have private health insurance, 139 while the remainder hold some form
of public insurance.' 40 Of those quantified as having group insurance,
about 70% obtain policies through their employment, either serving
as the employee or as the dependent of an employee. 14' Therefore,
only 15% of private insurance tends to be obtained through the indi-
vidual market. 142 Consequently, it is clear "that only ten to fifteen
percent of insured individuals are covered under individual health in-
surance policies."'1 43 These classifications impact the means in which
people are able to acquire coverage. They also play a role in the po-
tential threats posed by the increased availability of genetic informa-
tion to the general public about health concerns, as well as the medical
profession. In today's insurance marketplace, an increasingly signifi-
cant classification of insurance exists based on the type of insurance
possessed.
A. The History of Health Care and the Evolution of Managed Care
America's health care system has undergone vast changes over the
last 100 years, resulting in both positive and negative ramifications to
individuals and health care entities. The method of reimbursement of
traditional health insurance companies was fee-for-service. 44
Through fee-for-service, a physician provided a patient with treatment
and diagnosis exclusively, and had total discretion to utilize whatever
135. Id. A person's current state of health, as indicated from a health history and/or physical,
as well as their age and lifestyle, help to determine the possibilities for their future health insur-
ance status. Id. at 45-46. Insurers will further "utilize factors such as age, sex, previous medical
history, physical condition, occupation, the use of alcohol and tobacco, and even AIDS to class-
ify an insurance applicant." Burnett, supra note 76, at 505.
136. Burnett, supra note 76, at 505.
137. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 46.
138. See Kass, supra note 117, at 300; Rothstein, supra note 125, at 113.
139. Rothstein, supra note 125, at 113.
140. Kass, supra note 117, at 300.
141. Rothstein, supra note 125, at 113.
142. Kass, supra note 117, at 300.
143. Rothstein, supra note 125, at 113.
144. Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The
Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 207, 213 (1997).
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resources were necessary to handle a situation, regardless of cost.145
Physicians tendered bills to patients, and the insurance company cov-
ered the expenses.' 46 Consequently, due to the willingness of the in-
surance company to pay whatever costs were incurred, neither the
doctor nor the patient were persuaded to employ cost control meas-
ures.1 47 This resulted in excellent patient care and high profits to phy-
sicians, but extended heavy burdens on the insurance companies
required to fulfill payment schedules. 148 In essence, the fee-for-ser-
vice model encouraged physicians to over-treat and accumulate ex-
penses at alarming rates, which yielded significantly more money
landing in the doctors' pockets.' 49
With the increasing costs placed upon insurance companies, cost
containment measures became necessary for institutional survival.
Therefore, "escalating health care costs and innovative medical tech-
nology forced insurers, policymakers and employers to consider a new
method for the delivery of health care."'150 To this end, Congress
passed the Health Maintenance Act of 1973, marking the beginning of
managed care and a new system of affordable quality health care for
those enrolled.' 51
B. The Managed Care System and Utilization Review
When the Health Maintenance Act was passed in 1973, managed
care was thrust into the mainstream health insurance industry. De-
spite its popularity and current dominance, the concept of managed
care was not entirely new. 152 Prepared managed care plans were uti-
145. Id. "Physicians exerted exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment of patients
and had complete discretion to choose the method and cost of treatment." Id.
146. Id. Unlike the current managed care system, these bills submit by physicians were be-
yond review, and payment was made immediately without question. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Walsh, supra note 144, at 213.
151. Id. at 214-15. The intended purpose of the Federal Health Maintenance Organization
Act is to provide financial assistance to HMOs meeting the established criteria. Id. at n.32. This
financial aid is to come in the form of loans and grants allocated to individuals interested in
creating Health Maintenance Organizations that meet the established guidelines. Id. The
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17 (1994)
(amended 1976, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988).
152. Over 60 million people, about 24% of American workers and dependents, are eligible for
an HMO or other form of managed care entity. Frank J. Rief, III, The Evolution of Managed
Care, C653 ALI-ABA 1, 3 (1991). Today, 85% of insured employees have converted from tradi-
tional fee-for-service plans into managed care plans, including HMOs. Christine Gorman, Play-
ing the HMO Game: Denied Viagra and Inflamed by Horror Stories, Consumers Put Health
Reform Back on the Front Burner, TIME, July 13, 1998, at 22, 23.
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lized in various contexts: by nineteenth century slave owners in need
of medical protection for their slaves, by powerless workers concerned
with adequate health coverage, and by large industry dealing with in-
creasing numbers of work related injuries. 153 Managed care situations
were also instituted in some form or another in the late 1920s and
early 1930s when employers began to offer prepaid health care to em-
ployees.154 Regardless of the time instituted, managed care enter-
prises shared one thing in common - a commitment to cost
containment.
Managed care systems work toward cost containment in medical sit-
uations through a number of systematic structures, such as Health
Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") and Preferred Provider Orga-
nizations ("PPOs"). "An HMO is an organized system of health care
delivery for both hospital and physician services in which care delivery
and financing functions are offered by one organization. ' '155 As a re-
sult, patients have no flexibility in determining which provider to seek
medical treatment from because the HMO provider list is limited.
HMO service is provided for both a fixed and prepaid fee, and the
financial risk is shifted from the third-party payer to the service pro-
vider.156 "PPOs contract directly with an employer through the em-
ployer's health benefits department or indirectly through an insurance
carrier to provide health care services from a pre-selected group of
providers. ' 157 Due to the limited list of qualified providers, the over-
all expense to patients within a PPO is lower than a traditional insur-
ance program and participants have the flexibility to choose from a
listing of which physicians to frequent.158
The truth is, Americans are probably as healthy today as they ever were, and are paying
less for their health coverage. Thanks at least in part to managed care, vaccination
rates are up, premature births are down, more women are getting mammograms than
ever before and costs have fallen dramatically. Managed care saved between $150 bil-
lion and $250 billion last year alone out of total U.S. health-care spending of $1 trillion.
Id. at 24.
153. Walsh, supra note 144, at 210-11.
154. Id. at 212.
155. Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting:
Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.
1, 20 (1993).
156. Id. "This shift means that HMOs can obtain cost savings only by controlling both utiliza-
tion and expenses. They do so by encouraging fewer hospital admissions, more outpatient pro-
cedures, and fewer referrals to specialists." Id.
157. Id. at 22-23.
158. Id. at 23. "Physicians entering into provider contracts with PPOs agree to accept both
utilization review controls and financial risk shifting structures. Third-party payers give consum-
ers economic incentives to use the PPO physicians through reduced fees for services." Id.
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Managed health care is provided to subscribers on a contractual ba-
sis between the health care contractor and the managed care organiza-
tion. Several methods are utilized to monitor the care rendered: (1)
peer review and utilization review; (2) quality control and monitoring
of patient data; (3) cost control management; (4) high practice stan-
dards by physicians; and (5) efficient administration of the facility as a
business.159 Although these measures are significant in the realm of
managed care, utilization review is quite possibly the most well-known
and controversial, particularly in light of genetic testing and techno-
logical capabilities. 160
C. The Utilization Review Process
Utilization review attempts to maintain costs implemented by man-
aged care organizations by decreasing unnecessary medical proce-
dures, hospital stays, and patient tests.161 In other words, utilization
review assures that payment is only made in cases when the services
are absolutely medically necessary and appropriate given the patient's
needs and the plan policy.162 Each subscribing patient's records are
reviewed on a case by case basis by a practitioner in order to prevent
unnecessary and costly medical procedures. 163 Typically, a non-physi-
cian, such as a nurse, applies a predetermined set of criteria to review
the case presented and if the treatment suggested does not satisfy the
criteria, the matter is referred to a utilization review physician. 164 The
physician consultant and the attending doctor then discuss the case to
determine the medical necessity of the treatment. Non-authorization
results in non-payment of any claims, while authorization, sometimes
with restrictions, allows for reimbursement. 165 Three types of utiliza-
tion review exist: prospective, concurrent, and retrospective. 66
159. Rief, supra note 152, at 3.
160. Id.
161. See Randall, supra note 155, at 27. During the utilization review process a health care
entity determines if medical services are appropriate and necesssary.
Managed care products perform [utilization review] by examining providers' authoriza-
tion and furnishing of services to detect variations from the norm that may indicate
unnecessary or inappropriate care. When the third-party payer detects variation, it
either does not pay the provider's charges (retrospective [utilization review]) or refuses
to authorize the provision of the service (concurrent [utilization review] and prospec-
tive [utilization review]).
Id.
162. Michael A. Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liability for Utilization Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REv.
117, 117 (1991).
163. Walsh, supra note 144, at 216-17.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dowell, supra note 162, at 117-18.
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Prospective utilization review occurs before treatment, and requires
the physicians to obtain pre-authorization from the provider before
treatment is rendered. 167 This program is especially applicable in
cases of hospitalization, expensive testing, and situations involving
non-contract physicians. 168 The claim reviewer determines if the
treatment practice is necessary and if it is, then the treatment is ap-
proved and the procedure can occur.169 However, if the treatment is
not medically necessary, the reviewer will submit a refusal for reim-
bursement of the treatment costs.' 70 Concurrent review occurs
throughout the course of treatment to determine whether a prescribed
treatment is necessary at the time and specifies the last day for which
payment will be authorized.' 7' Retrospective utilization review, as the
name implies, occurs after treatment is completed. 172 If a reviewer
determines that a service undergone was unnecessary, the managed
care provider will deny to cover the costs of treatment. 73
Utilization review has not gone unnoticed in the managed care set-
ting.174 Since patient treatment, and sometimes well-being, is deter-
mined by the decision whether to authorize a prescribed method of
treatment, utilization review decisions are often a topic of debate. 75
Additionally, since all treatments and testing undergo utilization re-
view, this process plays a significant role in genetic testing
technologies.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 118. Prospective utilization review is likely to be the method of utilization review
employed when genetic testing is at issue. Id.
169. Walsh, supra note 144, at 216-17.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Dowell, supra note 162, at 118.
172. Dowell, supra note 162, at 117.
173. Id. at 118.
174. This is particularly because of what is at stake in the utilization review process. Utiliza-
tion reviewers have strong interests in minimizing treatments to patients to keep costs at a mini-
mum. Walsh, supra note 144, at 224. This often creates a conflict for physicians who determine
that treatment is medically necessary for the patient. Id. "Although the MCO may deny treat-
ment, the physician is responsible for the treatment and care of the patient. Therefore, the
question becomes, who is responsible when a physician stops treating a patient because the
MCO denies coverage for the treatment and the patient is injured as a result." Id. This is the
very question that has recently led to a number of court cases to decide who is responsible for
the patient after a denial of benefits from utilization review occurs. A description of such cases
is outside the scope of this Comment.
175. See id.
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V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HGP: THE GOOD,
THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
A. ELSI Initiative
With the discovery of new information comes an increased respon-
sibility to ensure that the knowledge is used properly.176 Further-
more, when new technological information is gathered, there exists a
greater responsibility to guarantee that the new information will not
harm the very people for whom it is supposed to benefit. 177 Genetics
is not unique to this heightened responsibility; in fact, it may be a
situation in which it is increasingly important for the information to be
handled with care, concern, and compassion. 178
Realizing that the influx of advanced genetic information presents
numerous ethical, social, and policy implications, early HGP advocate
and one of the founding fathers of genetics, 179 James Watson, pro-
posed that researchers address the increasing public and institutional
concerns related to the HGP's findings.' 80 Not surprisingly, when the
public began to hear about the genetic advances, discussions of the
practical implications and possibilities quickly circulated. Conse-
quently, fears about privacy, personal autonomy, individual health,
and corporate disclosure ran rampant.181 Seeing this as a problem,
and perhaps as an impediment to the progress of the HGP, Watson
backed a proposal that 3% or more of the HGP's research budget
would be allocated toward studying the project's ethical, legal, and
social implications.' 8 2 This led to the formation of a working group to
study the problem, the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
("ELSI") Program. 8 3 The ELSI Program was premised on the con-
viction that "combining scientific research funding with adequate sup-
port for complementary research in the social sciences and humanities
will help our social policies about science evolve in a well informed
and authoritative way."'184
176. HELLER, supra note 37, at 46.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
180. HELLER, supra note 37, at 46.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The ELSI Program deals with numerous issues, including: fairness in the use of ge-
netic information, privacy and confidentiality of genetic information, and potential stigmatiza-
tion due to genetic distinctions and reproductive issues. See Human Genome Project
Information: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) of the Human Genome Project (last up-
dated May 12, 1998) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/resource/elsi.html>.
184. HELLER, supra note 37, at 47 (quoting James D. Watson & Eric T. Juengst, Doing Science
in the Real World: The Role of Ethics, Law, and the Social Sciences in the Human Genome Pro-
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The ELSI Program has a fourfold mission. First, to anticipate and
define the implications expected to result from the HGP for individu-
als and society at large.185 Second, to examine the ethical, legal, and
social consequences of sequencing and accurately mapping the human
genome.186 Third, to stimulate public discussion of the issues cur-
rently identified and those arising in the future. 187 Fourth, and finally,
to develop policy options that will assure that the information result-
ing from the HGP will be used solely for the benefit of the individuals
and society that have a vested interest in the results. 188
B. Problems Raised as a Result of the Increased Knowledge
Regarding Genetics and Genetic Testing Resulting
From the Human Genome Project
Genetic research is marching forward, uncovering the roots of more
and more diseases, and inspiring hope that they may one day be cura-
ble. But at the same time, the extraordinary medical benefits are
clouded by the fact that gene research now offers insurance compa-
nies new ways to trim their expenses by denying coverage to those
most in need of insurance.189
"The public is waking up to the fact that genetic test information is a
double-edged sword: It can help people change behavior and prolong
life, but also it is used to classify people into risk categories. "190
The potential information resulting from the HGP will likely
change the history of modern medicine. 91 "The ability to identify ge-
netic disorders at an early stage, as well as the ability to identify the
specific genes which are predisposed to particular diseases, will in-
crease disease prevention and facilitate treatment."'1 92 In terms of ail-
ments that presently have no identifiable treatment or cure, the fruits
of the HGP will assist scientists with controlling aggravating environ-
mental factors.193 Similarly, the genetic information may assist in the
creation of new life because genetics has created a new area of repro-
ject, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES Xv-xix (George J. Annas et al. eds.,
1996)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, The Double-Edged Helix: Advances in Genetic Testing Re-
veal Yet Another Reason We Need National Health Insurance; Genetic Discrimination Could Pre-
vent a Person From Getting Disability Insurance, 29 WASH. MONTHLY 36, 36 (1997).
190. Gettlin, supra note 116, at 12 (emphasis added).
191. Burnett, supra note 76, at 512.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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ductive planning, as well as many other benefits outside the medical
field.194 However, genetic advances also have the potential for great
misuse and abuse, possibly negating the potential benefits and im-
provements. 195 Due to the severity of the problems presented, the
Council for Responsible Genetics 96 "fears that if genetic discrimina-
tion remains unchecked, it will prevent the HGP from realizing, if not
nullifying, its potential benefits.' 97 This is specifically applicable in
terms of the information being used by insurance companies and
other health related industries.198
The insurance industry has a history of fair discrimination through
risk classification. 199 Until recently, risk classification was the extent
of the discriminatory practices employed within the insurance indus-
try. Genetic testing was typically not a method used by insurers to
assess an individual's insurability because of the extreme cost and un-
certain results.200 This, however, has changed dramatically. With the
increased ability to determine genetic histories, predispositions, and
hereditary patterns, the greater reliability of the results, and the grad-
194. See id. at 512-13.
195. Id.
196. The Council for Responsible Genetics is a national bioethics organization based in Mas-
sachusetts whose mission is to educate the public about the ethical implications of developing
genetic technology and to advocate for the socially responsible use of the new genetic advance-
ments. The Council for Responsible Genetics, Position Paper on Genetic Discrimination (last
updated Aug. 18, 1997) <http://www.essential.org/crg/gendisc.html>. One of the Council's main
goals is to document cases of discrimination arising from new genetic technologies. Id.
197. Burnett, supra note 76, at 513. "For example, the public's anxiety with confiding in their
doctors and genetic counselors will increase for fear of losing employment or insurance. This
may deter individuals from taking advantage of genetic tests, early diagnosis, and treatment."
Id.
198. Many recent cases of genetic discrimination have been documented by the Council for
Responsible Genetics. See, e.g., Position Paper on Genetic Discrimination, supra note 196. For
example:
Seven year old Danny is in perfect health, but a genetic tests [sic] reveals that he has a
gene predisposing him to a heart disorder. Even though he takes medication that low-
ers his risk of a heart attack, he is denied health insurance. His insurance company
argues that since his gene has, been present since birth, this qualifies as a pre-existing
medical condition.
Id. Additionally:
Lisa's young son has been having difficulty in school. Suspecting a learning disability,
she consults her doctor. Her doctor performs some genetic tests, and tells her that
Jonathan has Fragile X Syndrome, an inherited form of mental retardation. Her insur-
ance company eliminates Jonathan's health coverage, claiming that his disability repre-
sents a pre-existing condition.
Id.
199. Burnett, supra note 76, at 505. The discriminatory practices employed within the insur-
ance industry are considered fair because the process consists of the systemic application of
variables uniformly against all applicants. See id. at n.16.
200. Id.
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ual decrease in the costs associated with genetic testing, insurance
companies have a new arena open to them.20' As a result of the com-
petitive nature of the insurance industry, and the desire by companies
to minimize risks and maximize profits, the potential significance of
genetic information would prove invaluable in determining insurabil-
ity.202 A great debate has resulted over whether insurance companies
should have access to genetic testing results, and the question remains
as to whether insurance companies would even be interested in using
the information available to them.
C. The Pros and Cons of the Use/Disclosure of Genetic
Testing Information
The possible ramifications of health insurance companies using ge-
netic testing results has gained much attention in recent years. Both
sides are very vocal, with supporters arguing that the only way insur-
ance companies stand a chance in light of adverse selection is to have
all the possible information available to the consumer.20 3 Opponents,
however, assert that there is no by-passing the potential for discrimi-
nation, and that this risk far outweighs the company's need for the
knowledge.204
Supporters of the insurance companies' right to possess and use ge-
netic information often look to the underwriting system for support.20 5
They argue that if their industry is denied access to genetic informa-
tion, it would violate the company's right to underwrite selected
risks. 206 Additionally, advocates argue that forbidding the knowledge
201. Insurance companies have already been known to use the results of genetic tests "'to
justify canceling coverage, saying that a genetic abnormality is a preexisting condition; to deny
coverage to unaffected relatives of a person with a genetic disorder; and to refuse to issue a
policy unless an applicant submits to a genetic test."' Bornstein, supra note 57, at 565.
In one study, researchers found that one hundred people were denied insurance bene-
fits because of genetic risks. According to one commentator, twenty-two percent of
families that were diagnosed with a genetic flaw have been denied health insurance,
while a survey of families with inherited diseases found that thirty-one percent were
denied coverage although there was no actual illness.
Id.
202. Burnett, supra note 76, at 506.
203. Deborah A. Stone, The Implications of the Human Genome Project for Access to Health
Insurance, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTHCARE 136 (Thomas
H. Murray et al. eds., 1996).
204. Id. at 137.
205. Id. at 138.
206. Burnett, supra note 76, at 514. See Sharing Genetic Data is a Question of Fairness; Insur-
ance Industry Should be Allowed to Use Genetic Information to Assign Risk Level, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVS. ED., May 26, 1997, at 18. To members of the
insurance industry, this deals with fairness in the knowledge of information.
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of such information would adversely affect the industry, resulting in
the elimination of the insurance field as it is known today.20 7 If ge-
netic testing procedures become more accepted by insurers and con-
sumers, positive developments are thought to result. "Rather than
stigmatize the individual, . . . genetic testing will become part of ra-
tional public health planning. In the end that decreases costs across
levels of society as we're able to find and prevent cancers" and other
diseases.208
Qpponents argue that if the insurance company has access to the
private information, a strong potential for discriminatory treatment
exists, which will result in higher insurance premiums or no insurance
at all.20 9 "The presence of abnormal genes in all individuals makes
each person a potential victim of this type of discrimination. The in-
creasing development and utilization of genetic tests will likely result
in increases [sic] genetic discrimination in the absence of contravening
measures. '210 A Health and Human Services Report, issued by
Donna Shalala, further cautioned that in order to reap the potential
benefits of genome research, people must be made comfortable with
the fact that the information will not be used against them.211 Such a
level of comfort is unlikely if the present consumer fears continue.
To preserve fairness, the insurer must have access to the same information that the
applicant possesses. It is fair to all insurers and insurance customers if we classify risks
when all of the cards are face down. It is not fair to allow an applicant to look at his
hand and force the insurer to play with unequal information, it is unfair to all customers
to permit some to exploit a special condition.
Id. In essence, insurers do not want to suffer from an information disadvantage that will harm
them financially.
If test results were unavailable to insurers, applicants who already knew from tests
performed by their own physician that they were predisposed to illness or early death
could buy large amounts of insurance coverage ... at rates that do not properly reflect
their known risk. If a large number of such applicants bought insurance, or if large
amounts of insurance were purchased, the ensuing claims would markedly exceed pro-
jected losses.
Stone, supra note 203, at n.10.
207. Stone, supra note 203, at n.10. The inevitable result is seen in a socialized system of
insurance benefits, meaning that significant increases to both consumers and insurers would re-
sult. Id.
208. Staff Reports, Some Doctors Support Genetic Testing in Mainstream Medicine, MED. IN-
DUSTRY TODAY, Feb. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS.
209. See Researchers Find Signs of Genetic Discrimination by Insurers, FED. & ST. INS. WK.,
Apr. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS.
210. Id.
211. See generally Insurer Groups Differ on Genetic Testing Proposal, BEsTWIRE, July 16,
1997, available in LEXIS (discussing the Health and Human Services Report and associated
academic studies supporting the claims of possible insurance discrimination). "So strong is the
fear of misuse of genetic information obtained in research programs that many physician-re-
searchers leave genetic test results out of the study medical record or warn study participants not
to give the information to their private physicians." Id.
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Opponents also argue that genetic testing information could improp-
erly be used to define genetic defects as preexisting conditions, result-
ing adversely in the allocation of insurance benefits. 212
Despite contrary contentions from opponents, it appears that insur-
ance companies presently do not now use, nor require, genetic tests
for coverage. 213 In part, this is due to the rarity of many genetic disor-
ders and the current lack of knowledge concerning the exact location
of some diseases on the human genome.2 14 This is also true because
genetic testing is still a rare practice, with a great deal of unfamiliarity
regarding the procedures and results, as well as skepticism regarding
the validity and usefulness of the tests in the insurance industry.215
Information shows, however, that although insurers presently do not
require genetic testing, they do base policy-making decisions on ge-
netic information.216 What sort of impact does this have on consum-
ers, particularly in terms of obtaining insurance in the first place?
Similar to the arguments for and against the use of genetic testing
information by insurance companies, a bifurcated group argues over
whether genetic information will affect an individual's ability to obtain
health insurance.217 Those contending that consumers need not worry
about obtaining coverage assert that most individual medical records
are typically not measured in insurance underwriting.218 For private
individuals seeking insurance, those denying any problem claim that
insurers have little reason to conduct genetic tests, and that even if
tests are conducted, the number likely to be adversely affected as a
result is extremely low. 219 This group also points to the fact that a
great deal of information is already obtained about an individual, in-
cluding their genetic make-up through results other than genetic test-
ing. 220 Finally, the cost of a genetic test is also viewed as prohibitive,
because insurance companies seem unwilling to spend the tremendous
212. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 118, at 143. "'If insurers have actuarial data demon-
strating a likelihood of future illness, they can limit coverage [of that illness]. More worrisome
would be a decision by an insurer to view a genetic predisposition as a preexisting condition."'
Id.
213. The Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Testing/Insurance Issues, supra note 125, at 329.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. This could include family history and diagnostic tests performed in past occurrences of
medical care to the applicant and the related family. Id.
217. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 57-59.
218. Id. at 57. That is, unless, of course, individual insurance is at issue.
219. Id.
220. Id. This would include physical examinations, chromosomal exams, and biochemical or
bloodwork conducted. Id.
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amount of money for the little information that will likely be gained in
the majority of cases.221
Another camp strongly urges that consumers do need to fear that
their genetic information will adversely affect their ability to obtain
insurance. From an employment setting, there is no guarantee that
employers must extend health insurance to employees, resulting in the
need for individuals to seek their own insurance and participate in the
medical underwriting process.222 Additionally, as the number of ge-
netic tests increases and knowledge of the results expands, the poten-
tial for abuse increases.223 Insurance companies are also seen as
having a great deal of access to the medical records of any given poli-
cyholder.224 There is also concern that as the information base contin-
ues to expand, the ability of insurance underwriters to stay informed
will be difficult, if not impossible, and perhaps detrimental to the indi-
viduals involved. 225
ANALYSIS
I. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
"Every human being has between four and eight genetic defects; thus,
we all have a serious stake in the outcome of legislative initiatives and
policies. "226
Attempts to address the fear of privacy, confidentiality, and dis-
crimination concerns,227 and the overall situation raised by the in-
creased knowledge and capabilities resulting from genetic information
and testing technology,228 have been scattered amongst both state and
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 15, at 58.
224. Id. Because insurers tend to gain medical information about an applicant from the appli-
cant's primary physician, information about the applicant is easily accessible, even information
thought to be protected by confidentiality laws. Id. at 59.
225. Id.
226. Susan O'Hara, The Use of Genetic Testing in the Health Insurance Industry: The Creation
of a "Biologic Underclass," 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 1211, 1224 (1993).
227. In order to truly understand the privacy debate, key terms must be clarified. See David
V. Foster & Erica Rose, Protecting Medical Information: Complicated Legislative Challenges, 8-
SUM EXPERIENCE 20, 20 (1998) ("If personal medical information is disclosed without authori-
zation, privacy or confidentiality have been violated. Discrimination occurs only if information
is used to the detriment (or benefit) of the individual to whom the information refers.").
228. A common perception is that genetic information is more sensitive or at risk than other
varieties of medical information, thereby warranting increased protection. See id. at 21. This is
not truly the case, however, as "there is no clear scientific distinction between genetic informa-
tion and other medical information. Most, if not all, diseases are genetically influenced." Id. In
fact, "medical information that is usually not considered genetic may,..., either be genetically
influenced, such as cholesterol level, or genetically determined, such as sex." Id. The practical
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federal agencies. 229 Most of these legislative attempts have arisen
within the last 8 years, with an increasing number of bills proposed as
more knowledge regarding the human genome is attained.230 In 1997
alone, the number of states prohibiting genetic discrimination by
health insurance companies more than doubled, 231 and the number of
proposed federal bills increased dramatically.2 32 Usually, this legisla-
tion and political action seeks to protect privacy interests and shield
against the threat of genetic discrimination. 233
implication of this is that much of the legislation that attempts to draw significant distinctions
between genetic information and general medical information may lack the definiteness neces-
sary for practical application. See id.
229. See infra notes 239-342 and accompanying text.
230. Id.
231. See Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 656
n.7 (1998) (citing 1997 ALA. Acrs 97-721; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West 1998);
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 742.405, 10123.3, 10140 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7
(West 1998); 1997 CONN. PUB. AcTs 97-95; 1997 FLA. LAWS CH 97-182; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
54-1 to 8 (1997); 1997 HAW. SEE. LAWS 91; 1997 ILL. PUB. Acr 90-25; IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-
7 (Michie 1997); 1997 KAN. SESS. LAWS 190; 1997 LA. Acrs 1418; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 223.1
(1997); MINN. STAT. § 72A.139 (1997); 1997 NEV. STAT. 412; 1997 N.C. SESS. LAWS 350; N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-H:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6.18, 17:48A-6.11, 17:48E-15.2,
17B:26-3.2, 17B-27-36.2, 26:2J-15.1 (West 1998); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.42, 3901.49,
3901.50 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135 (1996); 1997 TENN. PUB. ACrs 121;
1997 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1215; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie 1997); Wis. STAT. § 631.89
(1996)).
232. See infra note 242.
233. See Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues Raised by Advances in Genetic
Screening and Testing, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (1993). At Congressional hearings on
genetics and privacy, The American Society of Human Genetics has urged that any sufficient
plan to protect privacy interests in light of genetic testing must combine a number of require-
ments. Id.
These requirements include: (1) proceed on the premise that unauthorized disclosure of
genetic data to third parties may seriously harm the individual who has been tested; (2)
determine who should be authorized to collect genetic information, how it should be
stored, how it may be linked to other data, who should control access to it, who should
have access to it, and how such data may be used or released; (3) develop rules that
clearly define the permissible and impermissible uses of such data by third parties such
as insurers, employers, and school systems; (4) place the burden on those who would
use genetic data to limit access to insurance, employment, or other social institutions to
provide scientifically rigorous justification for that decision; (5) recognize that it is im-
portant to permit qualified researchers with legitimate protocols to gain access to ge-
netic data banks so long as the information therein is studied anonymously; (6)
characterize the violation of genetic data banks and wrongful collection, use, or dissem-
ination of genetic data as a criminal act and, also, create civil remedies for persons
harmed by wrongful disclosure; and (7) understand that the highest priority should be
given to developing innovative efforts to educate our citizens about genetics.
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The majority of legislation has occured at the state level,234 and it is
in this statutory realm that protections are primarily afforded to citi-
zens against discrimination or privacy issues. This happens despite the
fact that some legislators, insurance advocates, community leaders,
and members of the medical community at the state level argue that
state legislative action is not warranted. They contend that conflicts
potentially arise only when genetic information is used in the under-
writing process of individual insurance policies because these policies
do not view the group as a whole.235 Since a majority of individuals
hold group insurance policies through their places of employment, in-
surance advocates argue that society as a whole need not fear the in-
creased use of genetic information.236 Even if the use of genetic
testing results or other genetic information becomes mainstream, the
advocates argue that federal intervention may not be the most appro-
priate because a majority of citizens will not be affected.2 37 Finally,
because the states regulate the insurance industry, state legislation is
regarded as the primary source of resolution for this issue.238
II. STATE ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT GENETIC INFORMATION
A. The Purpose of State Legislation Regarding Genetic
Testing Information
State attempts to curtail the abuse of genetic testing information
have primarily occurred to protect privacy rights and to stop genetic
discrimination. 239 Between 1991 and 1996, 26 states enacted or con-
234. This is a result of industry regulation occurring within the state. Consequently, the analy-
sis with state legislative efforts seems most appropriate at this juncture, so state efforts will be
discussed first, with federal efforts following.
235. See supra notes 117-143 and accompanying text. See also Burnett, supra note 76, at 508-
09. This issue brings up the topic of ERISA preemption, which is well beyond the scope of this
Comment.
236. Burnett, supra note 76, at 508-09.
237. Therefore, it is suggested that federal action may not be mandated. Since very few indi-
viduals may be affected by the use of genetic information and test results by insurance compa-
nies, arguments have been made that state action is the most appropriate remedial measure.
238. The foregoing reasons for increased state activity are by no means intended to minimize
the role of the federal government in working to protect citizens from the dangers of genetic
discrimination. In fact, as will be shown shortly, federal efforts are of the utmost significance,
and may be the only alternative to assure protection of individual privacy.
239. See Helen R. Davis & Janice V. Mitrius, Recent Legislation on Genetics and Insurance, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 69, 70 (1996).
The statutes apply to health, life, disability, and self-insured insurance providers. How-
ever, several statutes explicitly exclude providers of life insurance from the statutory
prohibitions. Some statutes allow life insurers, but not health insurers, to use genetic
information in actuarial determinations. Apparently, life insurance is seen as 'less so-
cially significant' than health insurance.
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sidered legislation aimed at regulating the use of genetic informa-
tion.2 40 Since this time, a number of other states have contemplated
or passed similar legislation, with the emphasis on protecting individu-
als from genetic discrimination in terms of health insurance. 241 The
Id. at 72. Again, this Comment will focus on the implications of genetic testing on the health
insurance industry, and as such, the legislation discussed will solely deal with health insurance.
This is not to say that legislation does not exist in other realms, such as life insurance and em-
ployment settings, but legislation dealing with these topics falls expressly outside the scope of
this piece.
240. Id. at 71. These states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
241. See Oregon and Delaware specifically. See also Bornstein, supra note 57, at 589. "As of
October 1, 1998, some form of genetic discrimination legislation existed in thirty-nine states, and
numerous other genetic discrimination bills have been introduced in various state legislatures
between 1997 and [the start of 1999]." Jeremy A. Colby, Note and Comment, An Analysis of
Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed By the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443,
463-64 (1998). For example, some 20 states have established that insurers cannot deny coverage
as a result of genetic information, with several states establishing further protections pertaining
to premiums and coverage limits. Meredith A. Jagutis, Comment, Insurer's Access to Genetic
Information: The Call for Comprehensive Federal Legislation, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 439 (1999).
For a listing of recent state legislation see Colby, id. at n.192 (citing ALA. CODE §§27-53-1 to -4
(1998); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.54.100-.54.110 (Michie Supp. 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§20-
448 to -448.02, 20-1379 (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§23-86-304 to -306 (Michie Supp. 1997);
CAL. Civ. CODE §§56.17-.18 (West 1998); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.7 (West 1990);
CAL. INS. CODE §§742.405-.407, 10123.3-.35, 10123.9, 10140, 10140.1, 10143, 10146, 10148-
10149.1,10198.9,10705, 11512.7-11517 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10-
3-1104.7, 25-1-122.5 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§38a-816(19) (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§627.4301, 627.65625, 636.0201, 641.31073, 641.438, 760.40 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); GA.
CODE ANN. §§33-54-1 to -8 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§431:10A-118, 432:1607, 432D-26 (1998):
IDAHO CODE §§41-2221, -3940, -4708 (Michie 1997); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356t, 97/20-97/25,
513/45 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§16-39-5-2, 27-8-26-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA
CODE ANN. §729.6 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-2259 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§22:213.7, :250.3, :1214, 40:1299.6, :2210 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, 2850
(West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., Ins. §§27-208, -909 (1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §72A.139
(West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§33-18-206, -22-514, -22-526 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§44-5246.02, -6916 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. §§629.101-.201,689A.417, .545, .585, 689B.069, .420,
.550, 689C.193, .198, .207 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§141-H:l to H:5, 420-G:6 to G-7 (1996);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§10:5-5, :5-12, :5-43 to -49, 17:48-6.18, 17:48A-6.11, 17.48E-15.2, 17B:26-3.2, :27-
36.2, :27-57, :30-12, 26:2J-15.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§24-21-1 to -7, 59A-
23E-11 (Michie Supp. 1998); N.Y. Civ. Rioi-rrs LAW §§48-a, 48-b, 79-1 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1998); N.Y. ExEc. LAW 296 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 1997); N.Y. INS. LAW §§2612, 3221, 3232,
4305, 4318 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§58-68-30, -35, 95-28.1A (Supp.
1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §26.1-08012, -36.3-01, -36.3-06, -36.4-03.1 (1995 & Supp. 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§1751.18, 1751.65, 3901.21, 3901.49, 3901.491, 3901.50, 3901.501, 3924.031,
3924.27 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§659.036, 659.227, 659.324, 659.340,
659.700-.720, 746.135 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§28-6.7-1 to -4 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§38-41-
45, 38-71-670, -840, -860 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§58-17-84, 58-18-45, 58-
18B-27 (Michie Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§56-7-2701-7-2708, 56-7-2802 (Supp. 1997);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§21.401-.405 (West Supp. 1998); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. §9031
(West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§32.1-67.1 to-69.1, 38.2-508.4, 38.2-613 (Michie 1997 &
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range of coverage offered by these statutes varies by state. Some stat-
utes protect against genetic discrimination in health insurance,242
while others protect against genetic discrimination in the work-
place, 243 in disability insurance,244 or in limited respects against ge-
netic discrimination in life insurance.245 Additionally, as of the date of
this publication there are at least 60 bills pending in over 18 state leg-
islatures that would provide additional protections against genetic
discrimination. 246
The central purpose of the currently enacted or pending legislation
is to "limit the ability of insurers to use an individual's genetic infor-
mation to deny insurance coverage, to raise rates, or to reduce bene-
fits."' 247 To accomplish this, the vast majority of legislation attempts to
address every method that an insurer may use to deny coverage or to
provide different levels of benefits to individuals who may possess a
genetic trait or existing condition.248 Many states also prohibit insur-
ers from charging higher premiums to those with genetic conditions or
traits, and forbid insurance companies from considering genetic infor-
mation during the process of establishing policy rates.249
Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE §§33-15-2a, -16-1a, -16-3k (Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. §§111.372, 631.89,
632.746, 632.748 (1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§26-19-107, -306 (Michie 1998)). For an even more
extensive list of those statutes proposed in states but not yet acted on, see id. at n.193. For some
of the most recent state legislation, see 1999 KAN. HB 2088; 1999 MD. LAWS 50, 51; 1999 MONT.
LAWS 334, 472; 1999 OK H.B. 1368.
242. These states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See The Council for Re-
sponsible Genetics, Laws Regarding Genetic Discrimination (last modified Aug. 18, 1997) <http:/
/www.essential.org/crg/legislate.html>
243. Protections against discrimination in the workplace exist in Illinois, Iowa, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. See
id.
244. Both Arizona and Colorado have enacted legislative protections against genetic discrimi-
nation in the area of disability insurance. See id.
245. Limited legislative protections against genetic discrimination in life insurance exist in
Arizona, New Jersey, Maryland, and Montana. See id.
246. Bills are pending in the legislatures of Alabama, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
247. See Davis & Mitrius, supra note 239, at 72.
248. Id. The most common situation in which insurance coverage is denied occurs when an
applicant requests insurance coverage for the first time or seeks to renew an already existing
policy. The statutes therefore tend to prohibit insurance companies from utilizing genetic testing
information or testing when refusing to "issue, sell, renew, or consider an application for insur-
ance." See id. at n.24 (mentioning specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(D) & (E) (1989);
L.B. 1216, as introduced, 94th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 1995)).
249. Id. at 72. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.700 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West
1997). Insurers also cannot impose additional penalties on individuals with genetic conditions in
order to deprive them from coverage. Davis & Mitrius, supra note 239, at 72-73.
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A second goal of the current genetic testing legislation is "to protect
the privacy of genetic information and test results. '250 The statutory
prohibitions deal with the disclosure of genetic information or testing
results without the consent or knowledge of the individual involved.25 1
The statutes also protect a testing patient's family members by
preventing disclosure of the individual's genetic information and test
results, thus maintaining the privacy of closely related relatives.252 To
satisfy the requirement of consent, some statutes have allowed for dis-
closure in writing, while others require prior informed consent for the
release of the information.25 3
Genetic testing legislation also protects the privacy of the individual
patient by "limiting the insurer's ability to require" genetic tests as a
condition of coverage or policy renewal. 254 A number of legislative
efforts also forbid insurers from requiring applicants to submit infor-
mation about the genetic history or test results of a close family mem-
ber.255 Failure to subscribe to the above mentioned provisions can
result in the imposition of penalties, which, like the statutes, vary sig-
nificantly based on the state in question.256
In order to assist states in the difficult task of creating and passing
legislation that is both timely and comprehensive, various legislative
models have been created. 257 These models are "offered to encourage
discussion of the appropriate limits to be placed upon genetic screen-
ing and testing, and as a guide to the development of similar legisla-
250. See Davis & Mitrius, supra note 239, at 73.
251. Id. "Indeed, some statutes not only prohibit disclosure by insurance companies, but also
by hospitals and medical professionals." Id.
252. Id. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-613 (Michie 1996).
253. Davis & Mitrius, supra note 239, at 73. "Several statutes incorporate exceptions to limits
on disclosure if the information is needed to identify criminals, to respond to a court order, to
establish paternity, to provide genetic information of a decedent for the medical diagnosis of a
family member, and to identify dead bodies." Id. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-
1104.7 (West 1994).
254. Davis & Mitrius, supra note 239, at 74. "At least one statute prohibits not only insurance
companies, but also 'any person' from requiring or requesting genetic information." Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 75. "Most statutes fail to specify any possible penalties, causing one to wonder how
effective they will be. The remainder include one or a combination of civil, criminal, administra-
tive, or equitable penalties." Id. In California, bills include typical civil penalties, "such as a fine
of $1,000 plus court costs for negligent disclosure of genetic information." Id. A Minnesota
statute, 1995 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. § 72A.139 (West), uses administrative remedies, providing
that violators of the legislation are subject to the "'investigative and enforcement authority"' of
the state insurance commissioner. Id. "One California statute provides that disclosure of an
individual's genetic information that 'proximately causes economic, bodily or emotional harm"'
[is] a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000." Id.
257. See Barry Brown, Genetic Testing, Access to Genetic Data, and Discrimination: Concep-
tual Legislative Models, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1993).
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tion in the future. '258 The models range from allowing genetic testing
programs to exist within a state,259 enabling legislation for a state he-
reditary disorder program, 260 regulating genetic testing,261 to regulat-
ing genetic discrimination by insurers and employers.2 62
The state legislative actions to prevent genetic discrimination and
invasion of privacy have widely followed the prescribed models.
States have also taken independent initiative in creating new and
unique policies applicable to the fears and concerns raised within the
sovereign. As a discussion of all state efforts would be far too cum-
bersome for this Comment, only a sampling of states will be discussed.
The expansive New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act will be evaluated first
258. Id. The models are based on existing comprehensive state statutory schemes from Cali-
fornia, Maryland, and Wisconsin especially. Id. Not intended as finished drafts to be directly
implemented, the models "seek promotion of the dialogue necessary to generate laws which
effectively balance individual privacy rights with public health concerns." Id.
259. Model I-Enabling Legislation for a State-Wide Program of Genetic Testing and Coun-
seling. Id. at 1576-78.
260. Model II-Enabling Legislation for State Hereditary Disorder Program. Id. at 1578-82.
261. Model III-Regulation of Genetic Testing, Genetic Testing Laboratories, and Genetic
Research Facilities; Persons Authorized to Conduct Genetic Testing. Id. at 1582-87. Of particu-
lar interest from this Model are the provisions dealing with the conducting of genetic testing
(Section 11) and the remedies created for aggrieved parties (Section V).
11. Conducting of Genetic Test(s) and Investigational Test(s).
A. No Genetic or Investigational Test or Procedure shall be performed on any person
without his or her consent. No Genetic or Investigational Test or Procedure shall be
performed on any minor over the objection of the minor's parent(s) or guardian, nor
may any such test or procedure be performed unless the minor's parent(s) or guardian
is fully informed of the purposes of the Genetic or Investigational Test or Procedure
and is given a reasonable opportunity to object.
Id. at 1584.
V. Remedy.
A. An individual whose rights under this section have been breached as a result of any
violation of this section may recover compensatory damages and, in addition, may re-
cover civil damages not to exceed $50,000.00, reasonable attorney's fees, and the costs
of litigation.
Id. at 1586-87
262. Model IV-Regulation of Genetic Discrimination by Employers and Insurers. Id. at
1587-92. Section III of this Model deals specifically with genetic discrimination in insurance. Id.
at 1590-92.
III. Genetic Discrimination-Insurance.
A. The purpose of this section is to establish standards regarding unfair discrimination
among individuals of the same class in the underwriting of health, disability, or life
insurance on the basis of tests of a person's genetic characteristics; to establish mini-
mum standards for determining insurability which are sufficiently reliable to be used
for health, life, and disability income insurance risk classification and underwriting pur-
poses; to require the maintenance of strict confidentiality of personal information ob-
tained through a test of a person's genetic characteristics; and, to require informed
consent before insurers underwrite on the basis of a test of a person's genetic
characteristics.
Id. at 1590-91.
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as a comprehensive model for future state action. Wisconsin legisla-
tion will be discussed second. The legislative attempts in Wisconsin
were seemingly modeled after New Jersey regulations, but failed to
successfully incorporate all of the necessary provisions. The broad
Oregon approach will follow as an example of another extremely
comprehensive measure. Finally, Minnesota legislation will be ana-
lyzed as a valiant effort without total success.
B. Some Specific Examples of State Legislation
1. New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act
New Jersey's genetic legislation, the Genetic Privacy Act, addresses
many of the overall social concerns of the increased use of genetic
knowledge by creating a privacy right in an individual's genetic infor-
mation.2 63 The Genetic Privacy Act is one of the most comprehensive
examples of state action in protecting against genetic discrimina-
tion.2 64 This piece of legislation was introduced in the New Jersey leg-
islature during February of 1996 as an attempt to "provide a
comprehensive regulatory framework to protect against unwarranted
genetic testing, genetically based discrimination, and disclosure of ge-
netic information without consent. ' 265 To further this purpose, health
insurers are expressly prohibited from discriminating against individu-
als as a result of genetic information or test results, or due to a refusal
to partake in genetic testing procedures.2 66
New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act is unique because it deals with
the broad issue of genetic information and not merely genetic test-
263. F. Health Insurance Contracts.
i. No person shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between individuals of the
same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy fees, or
rates charged for any policy or contract of health insurance or in the benefits payable
thereunder, or any of the terms, or conditions of such contract, or in any other manner
whatsoever.
ii. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this section, an insurer may not make or
permit any differential in ratings, premium payments, or dividends for any reason based
on any genetic trait which is harmless within itself, unless there is actuarial justification
for it.
Brown, supra note 257, at 1592. See Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information and
Third Party Access to Information: New Jersey's Pioneering Legislation as a Model for Federal
Privacy Protection of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1998) (citing 1996
N.J. SEss. LAW SERV. 126). The New Jersey legislation has the potential to influence the future
of genetic information legislation due to the Act's breadth and because of the fact that it ad-
dresses the concern over whether the resulting information should be protected through privacy
or property rights. Id.
264. Burnett, supra note 76, at 525.
265. Stepanuk, supra note 263, at 1122.
266. Burnett, supra note 76, at 525.
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ing.2 67 As originally proposed, the Genetic Privacy Act created an
express property right in genetic information, and left the use of ge-
netic information to the discretion of the individual.2 68 By establish-
ing that all genetic information is private property, the New Jersey
legislation establishes strict provisions regarding the availability and
disclosure of genetic information and requires that genetic informa-
tion cannot be used without the informed consent of the individual
involved.2 69 Additionally, the Genetic Privacy Act provides that any
DNA sample obtained must be destroyed after the state's use is com-
plete or upon the request of the insured.270
The New Jersey Legislature passed the Genetic Privacy Act, but the
inclusion of a new property right in genetic information temporarily
halted the bill at the desk of Governor Christine Todd Whitman in
June of 1996.271 Governor Whitman conditionally vetoed the bill due
to the inclusion of a new personal property right in the genetic infor-
mation.272 In the face of objections and lobbying from ten of the
world's largest pharmaceutical companies located in New Jersey, Gov-
ernor Whitman cautioned "that a person could demand royalties from
a new product resulting from a clinical study which used that persons
[sic] genetic data. '2 73 "The Governor feared that a new statutory
267. Id. at 528. "By simply prohibiting genetic tests or the use of genetic test results, insurers
are still able to obtain vital genetic information from other sources, such as family medical his-
tory." Id.
268. Stepanuk, supra note 263, at 1122.
269. Burnett, supra note 76, at 528 (citing Sections 6 and 7 of the Genetic Privacy Act at
n.148). Section 6 of the Act states that "No person shall obtain genetic information from an
individual, or from an individual's DNA sample, without first obtaining informed consent from
the individual or the individual's representative." Id. Section 7 of the Genetic Privacy Act
states: "(a) An individual's genetic information is the property of the individual. (b) No person
shall retain an individual's genetic information without first obtaining authorization from the
individual or the individual's representative." Id.
270. Id. at 528-29 (citing Section 7 of the Genetic Privacy Act at n.149).
(c) The DNA sample of an individual from which genetic information has been ob-
tained shall be destroyed promptly upon the specific request of that individual or that
individual's representative. .. (d) A DNA sample from an individual who is the subject
of a research project shall be destroyed promptly upon the completion of the project or
the withdrawal of the individual from the project, whichever occurs first, unless the
individual or the individual's representative directs otherwise by informed consent. (e)
A DNA sample from an individual for insurance or employment purposes shall be de-
stroyed promptly after the purpose for which the sample was obtained have been ac-
complished unless retention is authorized by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at 529.
271. See id. at 529; Stepanuk, supra note 263, at 1122-23.
272. Burnett, supra note 76, at 529.
273. See id. See also Governor Whitman's Conditional Veto Message, Sept. 19, 1996, at 2
("One consequence of creating a property right in genetic information is that a person could
assert that right to seek royalties if genetic information from his or her tissue was used in the
research that led to the development of drugs, diagnostic tests, or patents.").
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property right would lead to an abundance of legislation to settle
these questions," and would result in potentially negative impacts on
the future of scientific research. 274 Specifically, the Governor be-
lieved that the provision creating a property right must be replaced
with a provision dictating a privacy right.275 Governor Whitman fur-
ther stated that the goals of protecting privacy and preventing discrim-
ination did not require a property right protection.276
As a result of her concerns, Governor Whitman sent the Genetic
Privacy Act bill back to the state Senate for reconsideration. 277 The
final version of the bill was passed without any mention of property
rights, and was signed into law by the Governor in November 1996.278
The current Genetic Privacy Act states that an individual's genetic in-
formation consists of "uniquely" private information about the indi-
vidual and consequently offers protection against unwanted disclosure
of this information.279
2. Wisconsin Legislation to Prevent Insurers From Using Genetic
Information to Deny Health Insurance Coverage
The state of Wisconsin attempted to prevent insurance companies
from discriminating against individuals by denying health care bene-
fits early on.280 Under the Wisconsin law, insurers are prohibited
from "requiring or requesting an individual or family member to ob-
274. Burnett, supra note 76, at 529-30.
275. Stepanuk, supra note 263, at 1124.
A property right in genetic information established the individual's ownership of the
material. Under American property law, an ownership interest is comprised of a 'bun-
dle of rights' which sets apart an individual's right to the material from anyone else's.
Property law has developed from the case law of the individual states. Therefore,
although classifying an object as 'property' implies the owner has autonomous control
over the object, the legal definition recognizes restrictions on a person's actions with
regard to their property. A privacy right, in comparison, attaches substantive due pro-
cess rights to the information which triggers heightened judicial scrutiny and requires
the state to proffer a compelling interest to obtain the information. Moreover, the
United State Supreme Court has recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right
that is essential to individual liberty. Privacy rights thus hold a more constitutionally
stable position than do property rights.
Id. at 1124-25.
276. Id. at 1125.
277. Id. at 1126.
278. Id.
279. Id. As a result, the deletion of the property right protection did not alter the initial
intention of legislators to protect individuals from the improper use of genetic information
against them. Id. "While the method of protection has been revised, the unique characteristics
of the legislation, mainly its comprehensives, remain intact." Id. at 1127.
280. WiS. STAT. § 631.89 (1997).
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tain a genetic test."' 281 Additionally, the Wisconsin law prohibits in-
surers from: (a) requiring or requesting the results of a genetic test
either directly or indirectly; (b) conditioning coverage benefits based
on genetic testing; or (c) considering genetic testing in the determina-
tion of rates or "any other aspect of insurance coverage or health care
benefits provided to an individual whether an individual or member of
the individual's family has obtained a genetic test or what the results
of the test, if obtained by the individual or a member of the individ-
ual's family, were. '282
Although Wisconsin's laws seems very thorough, they did contain
some problem areas. Specifically, the legislation fails to state how the
newly imposed regulations would be policed, or how enforcement of
any type would be funded.283 The enacted law "'focus[es] narrowly
on genetic tests, rather than more broadly on genetic information gen-
erated by family history, physical examination or the medical rec-
ord."' 284 Thus, the Wisconsin legislation left out the important
distinction that New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act expressly stated
when dealing with genetic information and not mere genetic testing. 285
3. The Broad Approach of Oregon Legislation
Like New Jersey, Oregon possesses one of the most comprehensive
statutes regarding genetic privacy, discrimination, and disclosure.286
Oregon law sets out to protect individual privacy while still allowing
for the furtherance of technological studies and examination. 287 Ore-
gon did this upon finding that: (a) the DNA molecule contains valua-
ble information regarding an individual's medical future; (b) genetic
information is uniquely private and personal information; (c) the im-
proper collection, retention, or disclosure of genetic information can
lead to individual harm; (d) analysis of DNA provides information not
281. Id.; see Lynn E. Egan, Note, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, 24 J. LEGIs. 237,
242 (1998).
282. Egan, supra note 281, at 242.
283. Id.
284. Id. at n.31.
285. See id. at 242.
Although state laws can and do prohibit using 'the results of a chemical test of DNA or
the protein product of a gene,' insurers 'may still use other physical/physiological (phe-
notype) indicators, patterns of inheritance of genetic characteristics, or even a request
for genetic testing as the basis for discrimination.
Id. at n.32.
286. See Bryce A. Lenox, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: Spoiled Fruits
of the Human Genome Project, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 189, 202 (1997). See also OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.700, 659.705, 659.710, 659.715, 659.720, 746.135, 659.036 (West 1997).
287. See OR. REv. STAT. § 659.705 (West 1997).
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only about the individual from whom a sample was obtained, but also
about the person's relatives; (e) current legal protections for such in-
formation are inadequate to protect privacy; and that (f) laws for the
collection, storage and use of DNA samples and genetic information
are necessary to protect the privacy of individual and permit scientific
research.288 This is accomplished through a requirement of informed
consent for the disclosure of information,289 the establishment of per-
sonal property rights of the individual in genetic information,290 and
the mandatory destruction of DNA samples after their use.291
The laws of Oregon "forbid an insurance provider from rejecting,
denying, canceling, limiting, or otherwise affecting any policy for hos-
pital or medical expenses on the basis of genetic information. '292 The
law also forbids insurers from using favorable genetic tests, showing
no genetic predisposition, for the purpose of inducing an individual to
purchase a policy.293
4. The Treatment of Genetic Information in Minnesota
In contrast to the legislation in Oregon and New Jersey, Minne-
sota's law regarding genetic testing and genetic information is signifi-
cantly less restrictive in that it only prohibits discrimination in certain
specified situations. 294 Minnesota's genetic discrimination legislation
states:
A health plan company, in determining eligibility for coverage, es-
tablishing premiums, limiting coverage, renewing coverage, or any
other underwriting decision, shall not ... (1) require or request an
individual or blood relative of the individual to take a genetic test;
(2) make any inquiry to determine whether an individual or a blood
relative of the individual has taken or refused a genetic test, or what
the results of such tests were; (3) take into consideration the fact
that a genetic test was taken or refused by an individual or blood
relative of the individual; or (4) take into consideration the results
of a genetic test taken by an individual or a blood relative of the
individual.295
Additionally, the Minnesota statute defines genetic tests as those
presymptomatic tests conducted to determine the presence or absence
of an abnormal gene or genetic defect known to be the cause of a
288. Id.
289. Id. at § 659.710.
290. Id. at § 659.715.
291. Id.
292. Lenox, supra note 286, at 202.
293. Id.; OR. REv. STAT. § 659.715 (West 1997).
294. Lenox, supra note 286, at 203.
295. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139, Subd. 3 (West 1995).
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disease or associated with an increased likelihood for the development
of a disease or disorder.296
C. Analysis of State Legislative Attempts to Deal With
Genetic Information
Critics around the country have cited numerous problems with the
various state statutes currently in force and those recently pro-
posed.2 97 First, many of the statutes are said to be too narrow, failing
to offer the broad protection necessary to abate discrimination. 298
Second, the various statutes have failed to reach a consensus of what
constitutes genetic information; therefore, this inconsistency has left
no national standard or expectation in terms of protections.2 99 Fi-
nally, because not all states have legislation regarding genetic testing
or genetic information yet, proscription of the activity deemed dan-
gerous to the insurance consumer does not appear to be a primary
concern among the states in general. 300
Does the lack of uniformity in the area of genetic testing and the
proscription of the use of genetic information indicate anything about
the positions of state legislators? Perhaps. The fact that some states
have enacted or proposed legislation while others remain silent to this
day may indicate that not all those in the state political arena feel that
genetic information poses a threat to consumers. Additionally, the
lack of uniformity within state statutes also tends to indicate that this
is a difficult area requiring more than state action. Maybe state incon-
sistency demands that more general action is needed, specifically fed-
eral legislative enactments. 301
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS REGARDING GENETIC
TESTING INFORMATION
"The numerous bills introduced by both the House and Senate since
1995 indicate that the cry for federal regulation has not fallen on deaf
congressional ears. " 3 0 2
296. Id. at Subd. 2.
297. Lenox, supra note 286, at 203.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 204.
300. See id.
301. Congress is aware that federal regulation is needed to protect against genetic discrimina-
tion in insurance, particularly because current state legislation tends to fail to safeguard citizens.
Burnett, supra note 76, at 530-31. State failures can be attributed in part to the state's inability
to offer protection to those individuals acquiring health insurance from self-funded employers as
a result of ERISA preemption. See id. at 531. This results in the conclusion that "federal action
is needed to establish a minimum level of protection throughout the country." Id.
302. Id. at 530.
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A. A Proposed Model For Federal Legislation
Just as the state legislatures have attempted to offer protections to
citizens regarding genetic privacy, the federal government has taken
actions to safeguard individual rights in the genetic realm. In a similar
manner to the model statutes presented based on state statutory
schemes,30 3 federal legislators have not been left to tackle the issues of
genetic privacy and genetic discrimination without guidance. In Feb-
ruary 1995, shortly before the proliferation of federal proposals began,
ELSI recognized a need for specific legislation to guard against the
potential misuses of genetic testing.304 Consequently, the group
funded a project to create a model statute for federal legislation. 30 5
The resulting Genetic Privacy Act and Commentary was intended to
"provide assurance that an individual's genetic information would not
be controlled or possessed by a third party unless properly authorized
to do so.'"306
The Genetic Privacy Act expressly prohibits unauthorized collec-
tion or analysis of materials containing DNA which could produce
identifiable information about an individual.30 7 Recognizing that ge-
303. See supra notes 260-264.
304. See Burnett, supra note 76, at 520.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 520-21.
307. Id. at 521. "Private Genetic Information" is defined by the Genetic Privacy Act as "in-
formation which is obtained directly from a DNA sample of an individual or of that individual's
family." Id.
The information which may be obtained through a genetic code is uniquely personal
and powerful since: (1) it contains information that the individual does not or may not
want to know but that the others such as insurers or employers would want to know; (2)
a great deal of information may be obtained about the individuals [sic] family members
as well as the source of the DNA; (3) advances in DNA tests and analysis will allow a
sample to be a continuing source of new information; and (4) governments have histori-
cally discriminated against those individuals who have been labeled genetically inferior.
Id. at n.109.
In order to protect individuals from the increasingly accessible access to their genetic
information (i.e., through saliva, hair, etc.), any person who analyzes genetic informa-
tion must, pursuant to the Genetic Privacy Act: (1) Provide specific information ver-
bally prior to collection of the DNA sample; (2) provide a notice of rights and
assurances prior to the collection of the DNA sample; (3) obtain written authorization
which contains required information; (4) restrict access to DNA samples to persons
authorized by sample source; (5) abide by a sample source's instructions regarding the
maintenance and destruction of DNA samples.
Id. at n.111. To provide still additional protection, the Genetic Privacy Act allows the source of a
DNA sample to retain the right to:
(1) Determine who may collect and analyze DNA; (2) determine the purpose for which
a DNA sample can be analyzed; (3) know what information can reasonably be expected
to be derived from the genetic analysis; (4) order the destruction of the DNA samples;
(5) delegate authority to another individual to order the destruction of the DNA sam-
ple after death; (6) refuse to permit the use of the DNA sample for research or com-
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netic information exists on a spectrum in terms of how damaging the
material is, the drafters of the ELSI Act did not include protections
for genetic information resulting from a standard medical report or
from a family medical history.308 The Genetic Privacy Act does allow
DNA collection for specified purposes, such as for identifying dead
bodies or for law enforcement purposes, such as in DNA profiling.30 9
The Act additionally provides special provisions regarding research
activities, minors, incompetent persons, pregnant women, and
fetuses. 310
Remedies and penalties are also provided for in the Model Genetic
Privacy Act.311 "To encourage individuals to assert their rights when
actual damages are minimal, the Genetic Act sets forth a lucrative
liquidated damages as well as treble damages in cases where a person
gains profit from negligently engaging in the unlawful use of genetic
information. '' 31 2 However, the Act does not discuss nor recommend
criminal penalties for violating provisions.313 "In sum, the drafters
stressed the importance of protecting individual privacy while al-
lowing proper and useful genetic research to continue. '314
B. Federal Legislation Regarding Genetic Materials Generally
Similar to the current status of state legislation in the realm of ge-
netic testing and health insurance, there is presently no comprehen-
sive federal legislation that proscribes "discrimination based on
genetic makeup or testing in either employment or insurance. '315
However, numerous steps have been taken at the federal level to pro-
tect citizens from the imposing threats of genetic discrimination in
health insurance coverage. 316 The first legislation proposed was the
mercial activities; and (7) inspect and obtain copies of records containing information
derived from genetic analysis of the DNA sample.
See id.
308. See id. at 522. Although the information from a medical report or medical history will
yield the same information as a DNA analysis, regulating all medical information was deemed
too problematic, overinclusive, and too disturbing to established medical norms and policies. Id.
309. See id. at n.117.
310. See Burnett, supra note 76, at 522. These protections include provisions as to the gather-
ing and maintenance of data, the way genetic testing material is to be discarded, how minors are
to be protected individually and as related to their parents, and how pregnant women can safely
undergo prenatal testing without fear that the results will be readily and easily disclosed. Id.
311. "To enforce its provisions, the Genetic Act allows for a private right of action as well as
equitable and injunctive relief." Id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 522-23.
315. Lenox, supra note 286, at 205.
316. Id.
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Human Genome Privacy Act of 1990.317 However, due to congres-
sional inaction, the legislative movement failed and no other federal
initiatives were enacted until the end of 1995.318 "Then, within a five
month period, six different bills regulating genetic information were
introduced. '319 Two additional proposed pieces of legislation in oppo-
sition to genetic discrimination include the Genetic Information Non-
discrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997320 and the Genetic
Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997.321
Currently existing protections come in the form of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 322 and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPPA").323 Attempts at new fed-
eral legislation continuously evolved, with varieties of previously pro-
posed or failed legislation also reemerging. In recent years, both the
Democratic and Republican parties have introduced legislation in the
House and the Senate.324 These proposals offer patients increased
rights, including the right to privacy and the ability to live free from
the fears of genetic discrimination throughout the various aspects of
317. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This legislation was not enacted because "[in
October, 1992, Congress adjourned sine di[e]. Thus, all unpassed bills pending at that time
died." See Bornstein, supra note 57, at n.105, 579. Perhaps the failure of this early Bill was the
best possible alternative, as the Human Genome Privacy Act contained many weaknesses, par-
ticularly in that it only prohibited disclosure of genetic information from government agencies,
and did not prohibit disclosure from other sources. See id. at 580.
318. Bornstein, supra note 57, at 579.
319. S. 1600, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); S. 1416, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 3043,
104th Cong., 2d Sess, (1996); H.R. 3103, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); H.R. 3160, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1996); H.R. 3185, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); H.R. 2690, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(identical to S. 1416); H.R. 2748, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See Bornstein, supra note 57, at
n.106.
Three bills, the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 [S. 1416, H.R. 2690
(identical)], the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1995 [H.R. 2748], and the Genetic Fairness Act of 1996 [S. 1600], were proposed to
protect individuals against genetic discrimination. In addition, three bills [sic] intro-
duced to improve the 'portability and continuity of health insurance coverage' to in-
clude restrictions on the use of genetic information for health insurance."
Id. at n.l0 (citing the Working Families Health Access Act of 1996 or H.R. 3043; the Health
Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996 or H.R. 3103/3160; and the Health Insur-
ance Reform Act of 1996 or H.R. 3185).
320. H.R. 306, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
321. S. 422, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
322. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); Lenox, supra note 286, at 205. Because of its focus
on the employment setting, the Americans with Disabilities Act falls outside the scope of this
Comment.
323. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Lenox, supra note 286, at 205. The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is also known as the Kennedy-Kassenbaum
Bill. See Lenox, supra note 286, at 207.
324. See infra note 325.
1999] PANDORA'S BOX
life that genetic information extends.325 Although impressive in mag-
nitude, there is little doubt that legislative attempts will not solve the
genetic discrimination problem. More important than the mass of leg-
islation is the quality of the written words, the potential for legislative
enactment, and the true ability for the legislative proposals to have
potential for successful regulation.
325. This would include legislation regarding genetic information in areas of health insurance,
life and disability insurance, and employment. The newly instated 106th Congress has already
placed genetic legislation on the table, with S. 543 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
genetic information with respect to health insurance), H.R. 293 (prohibiting health insurers and
group health plans from discriminating against individuals based on genetic information), and a
revised H.R. 306 (prohibiting discrimination against individuals and their family members on the
basis of genetic information or for requesting genetic services). The 105th Congress of the
United States also created significant legislation regarding genetics, including: S. 89 (prohibiting
discrimination against individuals and their family membrs on the basis of genetic information or
requests for genetic services), S. 422 (defining the situations under which DNA samples and
genetic information may be collected, stored and analyzed, to define the rights of individuals
with respect to genetic information, to define the responsibilities associated with increased ge-
netic knowledge, and to establish uniform rules and effective mechanisms to enforce said rights
and responsibilities), S. 1045 (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of genetic
information), H.R. 306 (prohibiting discrimination against individuals and family members on
the basis of genetic information or requests for services) (a discharge petition was filed in the
House on this last Bill), H.R. 328 (prohibiting health insurers and group health plans from dis-
criminating against individuals based on genetic information), and H.R. 341 (establishing limita-
tions regarding the use and disclosure of genetic information), H.R. 2198 (establishing
limitations on the disclosure and use of genetic information in connection with group health
plans and health insurance coverage and to provide for consistent standards applicable to hospi-
tal care in this area), H.R. 2215 (restricting employers in obtaining, disclosing and using genetic
information), H.R. 2216 (establishing limitations regarding the disclosure of genetic information
by life and disability insurers), H.R. 2275 (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis
of genetic information), and H.R. 3299 (establishing limitations regarding the disclosure and use
of genetic information in group health plans and health insurance coverage and to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of genetic testing information and results). From the 104th
Congress, the following legislation has been proposed to deal with the increased state of genetic
knowledge and the capabilities thereafter provided: S. 1416 (establishing limitations on the dis-
closure and use of genetic information), S. 1600 (establishing limitations on health plans regard-
ing genetic information), S. 1694 (prohibiting insurance providers from denying or canceling
health insurance coverage, or varying premiums, terms, etc., on the basis of genetic information
or a request for genetic services), S. 1898 (protecting the genetic privacy of individuals), H.R.
2690 (establishing limitations regarding the disclosure and use of genetic information), H.R. 2748
(prohibiting insurance providers from denying or canceling coverage or varying policy options
based on genetic results), H.R. 2873 (limiting the collection and use by the Department of De-
fense of individual genetic identifying material to the purpose of identifying remains when no
other consent is given), H.R. 3477 (restricting employers in obtaining, disclosing, and using ge-
netic information), H.R. 3482 (protecting the privacy of health information in the age of genetic
and other technologies), and H.R. 4008 (prohibiting health insurers and group health providers
from discriminating on the basis of genetic information).
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C. Overview of Federal Legislative Attempts
1. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
The first main protection against genetic discrimination pertaining
to health insurance is HIPPA of 1996, also known as the Kenndy-Kas-
senbaum Bill,326 signed into enforcement in 1996 by President William
J. Clinton. The Act represents "'a small but significant [step] toward
improving access to health care benefits."' 327 The most significant as-
pect addresses the portability of group health insurance. 328 HIPPA
states that group health insurance providers can impose a pre-existing
condition exclusion on an individual only if the exclusion relates to a
condition of any cause for which advice, diagnosis, treatment, or care
was recommended and the exclusion lasts for less than one year.329
More importantly, HIPPA declares that genetic information is not to
be considered as a pre-existing condition without a diagnosis of the
condition relating to specific genetic information. 330 Such a considera-
tion is significant, particularly in managed care areas and in situations
where individuals attempt to obtain health insurance apart from a
group setting and must be concerned with pre-existing condition ex-
emptions on their policies.
2. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act
of 1997
Introduced to the House of Representatives in early 1997, the Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1997331 prohibits health insurance discrimination by all group provid-
ers.332 They cannot deny or cancel coverage, refuse to renew, or vary
the premiums or conditions on the basis of genetic information or be-
326. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
327. Lenox, supra note 286, at 207 n.118.
328. See id.
329. See id. The exclusion period must also be decreased by the aggregate periods of credita-
ble coverage. Id.
330. See id. at 207-08.
The legislation, therefore, is significant because it forbids insurers from discriminating
against those with almost any medical condition or past history, as well as those who
undergo genetic testing, unless such testing results in the diagnosis of the condition.
Even in this situation, an individual can only be excluded from coverage for a maxi-
mum of one year.
Id. at 208.
331. H.R. 306, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
332. Id.
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cause the participant has requested or received genetic services. 333
The Bill defines genetic information as "'information about genes,
gene products, or inherited characteristics that may derive from an
individual or a family member of the individual."' 334
Legislation of this nature could be most useful if enacted and em-
ployed stringently. One of the greatest fears surrounding the genetic
information debate revolves around the potential for losing health in-
surance or of being saddled with high premiums and conditions of a
policy due to genetic predispositions and genetic testing results.
Although seemingly invaluable in protecting individuals from discrim-
ination, this legislation may be too broad because it fails to specify
behaviors that are deemed inappropriate for health insurance entities.
Without such specificity, there is a strong possibility that the insurance
industry will find ways to circumvent any legislation, thereby negating
the protections sought after by legislators and the public at large.
3. Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997
Dubbed Senate Bill 422, The Genetic Confidentiality and Nondis-
crimination Act of 1997,3 35 sponsored by Senator Peter Domenici, is
the most comprehensive bill at this time dealing with genetic discrimi-
nation and privacy issues. 336 The Bill provides that no person can col-
lect any sample of DNA without a written authorization from the
participant. 337 After any genetic sample is extracted, the entity col-
lecting the DNA must inform the individual of what the information
will be used for, the potential protections offered by this Bill, the op-
tions available for genetic counseling, and various other rights pro-
vided.338 After analysis, samples are to be destroyed unless written
authorization for storage is given by the individual.339
The Bill also prohibits the use of genetic information by health in-
surance companies.340 Health insurers are prohibited from terminat-
333. See Lenox, supra note 286, at 209; The Council for Responsible Genetics, The Slaughter/
Snowe Bills HR 306 and SB 89 (last modified Aug. 15, 1997) <http://www.essential.org/crg/
306_89_txt.html>.
334. Lenox, supra note 286, at 209-10 (citing H.R. 306 § 3(a)(1)).
335. S. 422, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). See Lenox, supra note 286, at n.139 (discussing
another similar piece of legislation introduced in the House of Representatives by Representa-
tive Clifford Stearns). This Bill, the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997 (H.R.
341), draws a great deal of support from Oregon's Genetic Privacy Act.
336. Lenox, supra note 286, at 210; The Council for Responsible Genetics, The Domenici Bill
SB 422 (last modified Aug. 15, 1997) <http://www.essential.org/crg/422_txt.html>.
337. See Lenox, supra note 286, at 210.
338. Id.
339. See id.
340. See The Domenici Bill SB 422, supra note 336.
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ing, restricting, limiting or refusing to renew coverage, denying
insurance coverage, imposing riders or establishing rate differentials
as a result of genetic information. 341 The Bill also states that "[a]n
insurer [health] shall not require an applicant for health insurance
coverage, or an individual or family member who is enrolled.., to be
subjected to a genetic test or to be questioned about genetic
information." 342
The extensive specificity of this legislation possesses great potential
in terms of protecting individuals from the privacy invasions. Not only
does this Bill discuss the provisions under which samples can be ex-
tracted and used, but it also discusses the prohibition of the use of
such extracted information by health insurance entities. This Bill is
also significant in that it not only protects the individual who under-
goes a genetic test, but also their family members who may likewise
possess the same or similar genetic make-up.
D. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
Federal legislative attempts to protect citizens from the dangers of
genetic discrimination and the potential problems of increased genetic
knowledge appear to offer more sound solutions than existing or pro-
posed state remedies. However, as the analysis of the above refer-
enced bills indicated, even the federal bills vary greatly in coverage
and composition. Some offer specific remedies and prohibition plans
for issues of genetic discrimination, but ignore the problems of gene
privacy and other forms of invidious discrimination in the health in-
surance marketplace. 343 Still others focus on only one facet of genetic
protection while leaving the others untouched. This demonstrates
that consensus and uniformity are necessary at the federal level before
genetic protections can truly be created. Additionally, legislation
must be comprehensive, integrating as many facets of existing and po-
tential genetic knowledge as possible to provide the greatest protec-
tions. Citizens must feel confident in all aspects of their medical lives,
believing that their personal information will remain private and will
not be used against them in any way.
Although problems appear within the proposed federal legislation,
these actions cannot go unnoticed. Attempts to solve the genetic dis-
crimination puzzle at the federal level are extremely valuable and
must be examined closely so that the best remedy can be uncovered.
341. Id.
342. See id.
343. Lenox, supra note 286, at 211.
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Until legislators can agree on what areas of an individual's privacy
must be protected against threats of genetic discrimination, and issues
of personal privacy outweigh business interests, individual security
cannot be fully acknowledged. Until that time, individuals must pro-
tect themselves and others from abuse of their genetic make-up.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SIGNIFICANCE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA
Increased genetic knowledge poses tremendous impediments to
personal privacy and autonomy. This is especially true in the informa-
tion age where medical information is constantly transferred between
sources, individuals, and entities. "Millions of individual medical
records float around these days in a vast electronic network that
serves both commerce and scientific research. '344 This medical infor-
mation rapidly moves throughout the country's computer networks. 345
Not only do computers assist in the transfer of patient records and
information, but they "help diagnose disease, monitor patients, organ-
ize the data about [patient] conditions, and transmit the information
to managed-care networks, medical research networks, pharmaceuti-
cal benefits managers, and other outposts of America's increasingly
wired health-care system. '346 As a result, individuals are extremely
vulnerable to those regulating the medical industry, particularly those
in health insurance and managed care organizations. 347 Computers
are not the only source through which the medical information passes,
for people monitor computers and await the patient information being
transferred .348
Consumers should not underestimate the role that individual insur-
ance entities play in the computer and shared medical information in-
dustry. This is especially true in managed care situations, 349 where the
basis of the insurance system is shared information. 350 "Whether it is
344. Id.
345. Id. Although the records are seemingly passed through secured internal networking pro-
grams within insurance entities, some records can even be accessed through the Internet as "part
of a $40 billion medical information industry." Id.
346. Id. Throughout the process, numerous individuals scan the data and analyze the infor-
mation contained therein. Id.
347. Most "people would be very surprised" to learn "just how exposed they are" within the
medical community. Allen, supra note 116.
348. "Those eyes may belong to health researchers seeking improved treatments, or to corpo-
rate managers bent on slashing costs, or to drug-company marketers looking for new customers."
Id.
349. Managed care accounts for at least 80% of employer-based insurance coverage to date.
Id.
350. "Without a doubt, managed care plans could use genetic information in databases to the
disadvantage of people with genetic predispositions to disease; the pertinent question is whether
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to improve care, as the insurers would claim, or to cheapen it, as their
critics charge, managed-care companies intervene at every stage to
evaluate whether patients are getting the treatment the insurers pre-
scribe. ''351 Numerous people examine a patient's records in a man-
aged care setting, especially in the utilization review process, which
would place personal privacy and confidentiality at risk. In the age of
genetic knowledge this is particularly significant since review occurs
continually along the spectrum of care.
Unlike traditional fee-for-service insurance institutions where little
internal review is regularly conducted, managed care systems evaluate
records whenever treatment is sought, referrals are made, or coverage
is questioned. Therefore, where one doctor, nurse, or other utilization
reviewer could examine a patient record and ignore the results of a
genetic screening, another could bring issue, raising havoc for the in-
sured's coverage plan. Another concern within the managed care
arena is raised regarding the coverage of genetic testing services and
the potential obstacles faced by a prescriber interested in learning
more about his or her genetic make-up without disclosing such infor-
mation to the managed care entity.352 From one perspective, genetic
testing and screening may prove too costly to benefit managed care
entities. 353 Managed care organizations could also use genetic testing
to their own ends. 354 Yet another alternative within the managed care
setting is that collective choices would be made regarding genetic
testing. 355
Little is certain about the role that managed care will have in the
genetic testing debate. Since each company institutes policies, proce-
dures, and plan guidelines, no uniform statement regarding the indus-
they would." Lois WINGERSON, UNNATURAL SELECTION: THE PROMISE AND THE POWER OF
HUMAN GENE RESEARCH 279 (1998).
351. Allen, supra note 116.
352. For instance, the Prudential Insurance Company of America, comprising a major part of
the managed care market with 15, million health care subscribers, "does not reimburse for tests
and treatments it considers to be investigational." Should Insurance Pay for Preventive Services
Suggested by Genetics?, supra note 64. This raises a number of concerns given the fact that early
detection of genetic difficulties can lead to treatment options, but often newly discovered genes
and genetic tests are potentially deemed investigational or experimental by insurance providers.
This also raises problems in that "a managed care plan that is privy to gene test results might try
to force a couple to abort an affected fetus by refusing to pay for its care after birth, or pressure
them in more subtle ways. One such case is already on record, involving a fetus affected by
cystic fibrosis." WINGERSON, supra note 350, at 269.
353. Id. at 266. This could result in only the rich, lucky, or adventurous being able to utilize
the testing capabilities. Id. at 266-67.
354. Id. at 267. This is definitely one area where problems for the individual could arise.
355. Id. "Setting this scenario in place would require careful planning and vigilance on the
part of everyone involved." Id.
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try's use or non-use can be clearly made. It is more clear that the
institution of managed care is uniquely prone to have problems with
genetic data because of the way the plans are managed and review
occurs. The potentially constant utilization review, as well as the mul-
tiple individuals who review and have access to patient medical infor-
mation, puts those in managed care plans at a distinct and increased
risk for genetic information problems.
IMPACT
The debate over whether legislation will assist in the protection of
genetic privacy and squelch the potential for discrimination will likely
continue until a total ban is in place and citizens can feel comfortable
with the information available to their insurance providers. Perhaps
this ban will occur at the state level, but more likely protections will
be offered through some sort of combined federal regulatory scheme.
Although the future remains dim until genetic information cannot be
exploited, unnecessary fear should not harm the current insurance in-
dustry. Insurance is necessary, although not mandatory in society.
This is especially true in light of the ever-increasing costs associated
with health coverage, and the fact that most individuals cannot afford
their own medical treatment. Consequently, it is necessary to ensure
that the insurance industry can operate properly, without the pressure
of lobbyists and critics. Insurance may not be a perfect field, but the
underwriting process has been tried and true. Therefore, drastic
changes to the presently working norms may be more detrimental
than allowing insurers access to genetic information.
The era of managed care ushers in a whole new group of conten-
tions to the genetic information debate. On the one hand, managed
care systems exist and are expanding on the basis that cost-contain-
ment is necessary within the medical field. Consumers appreciate this
through lower premiums and the health industry appreciates the at-
tempts to help lower costs across the board. However, with this sys-
tem of managing care comes trade-offs, one of which being the fact
that information passes through numerous hands, making privacy and
confidentiality increasingly difficult to maintain. Utilization review-
ers, business planners, and a number of other managed care partici-
pants may have reason to review a specific patient file at any given
point in time. Although such activity results from cost-conscious ef-
forts, costs should not be the only consideration.
Individuals highly value privacy. Some areas of a person's life are
difficult to keep private, for they result in outward manifestations that
can potentially be visualized or understood by others. Genetics can
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operate on a different level. Typically, unnoticeable to the human eye
and often undetected by the individual possessing the genes unless
intrusive testing is conducted, the genetic make-up of an individual is
highly personal and private. With the advent and increasing use of
genetic testing technology, however, potential privacy abuses abound.
This is where the arguments begin about whether genetic testing re-
sults should be shared or utilized by third parties. Regardless of the
decisions of legislators and courts, the fact remains that genetic infor-
mation is readily accessible and will only become more prominent in
the health community. Consequently, action must be taken to protect
the technology, the individuals, and the interests of the health insur-
ance entities.
Sound arguments are presented on both sides of the insurance/ge-
netic testing information debate. On the one hand, insurance compa-
nies need and deserve to operate on a level playing field with
consumers. If individuals applying for new or renewal coverage pos-
sess information that no one else has access to, this will most likely
hurt the system as a whole. However, if the insurance companies have
access to the private and personal genetic information of individual
consumers, the potential for abuse is too significant to go unnoticed.
This is particularly true given the truly personal and informative na-
ture of any DNA material. The ramifications are just too great to al-
low anyone access to what makes a person an individual being.
Insurers claim that any legislation will be counter-productive to the
goal of making health insurance available at a reasonable cost. In es-
sence, if consumers refuse to undergo or disclose genetic information
or specific genetic test results, the ability for insurers to classify indi-
viduals into lower risk groups will no longer exist. As a result, people
will have to face potential insurance coverage as high risk candidates
that pay higher premiums. As the national average for premiums
would subsequently increase, the result could likely be an insurance
industry consisting of ever-increasing costs that eventually prices itself
out of existence. Not only would this run contrary to the general pur-
pose of insurance in assisting consumers, but it would also be danger-
ous to individuals who require expensive constant or emergency
medical treatment.
Due to the overall failure of state legislatures to assist in the genetic
testing dilemma, the federal government must deal with difficult situa-
tions and make extremely hard decisions. All of this is the direct re-
sult of the governments zealous desire to progress the state of genetic
knowledge well into the future through participation in the HGP. Es-
sentially, the government is now faced with the arduous task of right-
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ing the wrongs created by past political decisions. Although this may
not be a new political decision faced by those in Congress, the fact is
that this is a serious matter that cannot fall victim to political partisan-
ship, internal disputes, and corporate lobbying efforts. Far too much
is at stake to ignore the risks and repercussions to all humankind if
this issue is not resolved in a timely manner. Otherwise, who is to say
that a new discovery will not soon be made that will not totally oblit-
erate any protections that may currently exist at the expense of per-
sonal privacy, autonomy, and confidentiality?
CONCLUSION
Due to the overall failure of the legislature to assist in the genetic
testing dilemma and the potential for increased privacy infringements
and confidentiality breaches due to the information transfer of the
managed care system, something must be done to protect the privacy
and welfare interests of all citizens. Although a minor percentage of
health insurance consumers face the potential for discrimination due
to the use of genetic testing information and results, all individuals
must consider the consequences of increased genetic knowledge. De-
spite the fact that insurance companies are considered the business
entities prone to use such information, the possibility of use spreading
to other areas and industries is exceptionally high. Therefore, it is of
the utmost importance that the issue of genetic testing be settled at
this early stage. Only when the problem can be stopped will consum-
ers be able to live in the confidence that their genetic privacy remains
intact.
Jennifer M. Jendusa
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